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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law plays a key role in mediating the 
allocation of power among the branches of government.  
Between the executive and judicial branches, administrative 
law governs how courts can review agency decisions, and 
what rules apply to that review.1  These principles involve the 
oft-discussed questions of standards of review and deference 
to agency decisions, including the widely studied Chevron 
 
 1. See STEVEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY xxxix (6th ed. 2006). 
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doctrine.  Much less discussed, though equally important in 
mediating the allocation of power, is the Chenery doctrine.  
This doctrine provides that a court reviewing an agency 
action may only affirm that action on the grounds articulated 
by the agency when it made its decision.2 
In imposing this limit on judicial review, Chenery 
protects the proper separation of powers between branches of 
the federal government.3  In particular, Chenery protects the 
authority delegated to agencies by Congress from usurpation 
by the courts.  By denying courts the ability to substitute 
their own decisionmaking process for an agency’s, it keeps 
power within those institutions most competent to exercise it.  
But in spite of its place as a “ ‘fundamental’ and ‘bedrock’ ” 
principle of administrative law,4 relatively little scholarship 
has analyzed exactly how courts apply Chenery in practice.5  
This dearth in scholarship may be partly attributable to a 
basic premise of administrative law—that there are 
fundamental principles, like the Chenery doctrine, relating to 
agency action and judicial review thereof that are 
 
 2. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).  SEC v. 
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947), is also associated with another 
doctrine of administrative law—that agencies have discretion over the 
procedural form of their actions.  See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203; M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004). 
 3. See Harold J. Krent, Ancillary Issues Concerning Agency Explanations, 
in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 197, 197 
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. 
Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 504 (2011). 
 4. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE 
L.J. 952, 955 (2007) (quoting from Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196 and Konan v. 
Att’y Gen. of the United States, 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 5. The few pieces of scholarship focusing on Chenery include a 1969 article 
by Judge Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and 
Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199 (1969), Kevin M. Stack’s 
The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, supra note 4, a student note 
proposing a relaxation of the Chenery doctrine, Note, Rationalizing Hard Look 
Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (2009), and two pieces looking at 
Chenery’s application in specific substantive areas: Bryan C. Bond, Note, 
Taking It on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply in Social 
Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157 (2011); Matthew 
Ginsburg, “A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock”: The D.C. 
Circuit’s Misuse of Chenery Remands in NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595 
(2008).  Sapna Kumar has also more briefly addressed the Federal Circuit’s 
application of Chenery in part III.C. of her recent article, The Accidental 
Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 267–74 (2013), in arguing that the Federal Circuit 
acts more like an agency than a court. 
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transsubstantive, applying in the same way to widely 
divergent areas of law.6  In practice, however, the effect and 
application of administrative principles such as Chenery can 
differ substantially across agencies, areas of law, and courts.7  
As a consequence, attempts to reach a fundamental 
understanding of the Chenery doctrine can be hindered—or at 
least confused—by the broad range of ways in which the 
doctrine is actually applied by different courts and in 
different substantive areas. 
In this Article, I seek to better understand the Chenery 
doctrine with a case study: its application to Federal Circuit 
review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decisions 
to reject patent applications.  While there is a growing body of 
scholarship examining the relationship between patent and 
administrative law, it has focused on standards of review, 
largely leaving Chenery out of the picture.8  Despite the focus 
on standards of review, scholars have noted that these 
standards have more symbolic than practical importance in 
patent cases, rarely affecting the outcomes.9  In contrast, 
whether and how courts apply Chenery has real, tangible 
effects on judicial review.  This Article is an effort to rethink 
Chenery’s on-the-ground mechanics and its implications for 
 
 6. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 499 & n.1 (describing this basic 
premise and stating that it “certainly holds true for iconic administrative law 
decisions like Chenery”). 
 7. See id. at 499–500 (“[J]udicial precedents tend to rely most heavily on 
other cases involving the agency under review, even for generally applicable 
administrative law principles.  As the courts repeated the verbal formulations 
or doctrinal approaches reflected in those cases, both the articulation and 
application of the doctrine often began over time to develop their own unique 
characteristics within the precedents concerning the specific agency.  In some 
cases, these formulations deviated significantly from the conventional 
understanding of the relevant principles as a matter of ‘administrative law.’ ”). 
 8. The exception is the recent article by Professor Kumar, supra note 5, at 
267–74. 
 9. Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1978 (2009) (“Orin Kerr has called Zurko’s pondering of the 
level of deference to give to the PTO’s factual findings ‘a question with more 
symbolic than practical importance,’ the results of which are not ‘likely to have 
a significant impact on the functioning of the patent system.’ . . . [T]he number 
of cases affected by the difference is small—as the Supreme Court in Zurko 
itself noted, the functional difference between an ‘unsupported by substantial 
evidence’ standard and a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is vanishingly small . . . .” 
(citing Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 127, 168 (2000))). 
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the allocation of power between agencies and courts, as a 
matter of administrative law generally, and more specifically 
between the Federal Circuit and the PTO.  By undertaking 
this study, this Article also addresses an important but yet 
relatively unexplored aspect of how administrative law is 
translated (and sometimes mistranslated) into the realm of 
patent law. 
Three factors combine to make appeals from the PTO an 
especially interesting area for examining the scope and 
application of Chenery.  First, the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit over appeals of patent application denials by 
the PTO10 creates a uniform framework to study the 
doctrine’s application.  Second, the Federal Circuit has taken 
a more aggressive stance on Chenery than most other courts, 
holding that it applies to fewer types of agency decisions, thus 
limiting judicial review in fewer circumstances.11  This view of 
Chenery is consistent with other instances of Federal Circuit 
exceptionalism in administrative law as applied to the PTO, 
which result in the Federal Circuit often according the PTO 
less deference than most other agencies are accorded.12  This 
more limited view of Chenery, combined with the complicated 
doctrinal structure of patent law, reveals ambiguities in the 
doctrine.  Third, the more limited authority of the PTO as 
compared to other agencies highlights the Chenery doctrine’s 
role in mediating the balance of power between agencies and 
courts.  Thus, a focused inquiry into Chenery’s application in 
patent law ultimately leads to insights about the power 
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the PTO, as 
well as about the fundamental meaning and effects of 
Chenery that are applicable to administrative law more 
generally. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the origins 
of the Chenery doctrine and its doctrinal evolution.  Part II 
explores specific instances in which the Federal Circuit has 
discussed Chenery in appeals from PTO decisions.  I highlight 
several inconsistencies and ambiguities in the application of 
 
 10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012). 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 
284–308 (2007). 
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Chenery.  If the doctrine’s application is unpredictable—as I 
argue it is—that is troubling because the unpredictability 
undermines Chenery’s purpose of ensuring the appropriate 
separation of powers between the judicial and executive 
branches when courts review agency action.  In particular, 
uncertainty about when Chenery applies gives a court greater 
control over whether it will defer to agency reasoning or 
whether it will instead substitute its own.  The consequence 
is a significant danger of court encroachment on 
congressionally delegated agency power.  While this concern 
applies across administrative law, it is particularly acute in 
the context of the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO decisions, 
where there is significant evidence of Federal Circuit 
resistance to granting the agency deference. Part III draws 
lessons from this case study for both patent appeals and the 
role of Chenery more generally.  I discuss a range of ways to 
rethink Chenery, focusing on how the doctrine can be made 
more predictable while having an appropriate scope.  I 
ultimately propose a better Chenery doctrine for patent law 
based on the doctrine’s costs and benefits, and on 
fundamental separation of powers considerations.  This 
rethought Chenery doctrine reflects a more cogent approach 
to the relationship between the decisions by administrative 
agencies and the courts. 
I. THE CHENERY DOCTRINE 
A. The General Principle 
In reviewing a lower court decision, an appellate court 
will generally affirm the lower court’s judgment on any 
ground established by the record, regardless of whether the 
lower court relied on that ground.13  But when a court reviews 
an administrative decision, SEC v. Chenery Corporation 
provides that “an administrative order cannot be upheld 
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising 
its powers were those upon which its action can be 
 
 13. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of 
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, it 
must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave 
a wrong reason.”). 
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sustained.”14  The decision must be judged based on the 
grounds relied upon in the record—not on post hoc 
justifications—and the court cannot substitute its own 
rationale for the decision.15 
SEC v. Chenery Corporation (Chenery I) arose out of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) duty under the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 to 
reorganize public utility holding companies.16  During 
reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation, the 
SEC concluded that the corporation’s directors, officers, and 
controlling stockholders could not purchase preferred stock.17  
The SEC’s rationale was that such purchases would violate 
the established fiduciary duties of the directors, officers, and 
controlling stockholders.18  The corporation challenged this 
decision.  When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court held that established judicial precedents did not dictate 
that their fiduciary duties precluded the purchases.19  The 
Court reversed the SEC’s decision and remanded to the 
agency.20  The Court suggested that the SEC could have 
prohibited the purchase arrangement under PUHCA, but it 
held that because the SEC’s decision was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the judicial precedent on fiduciary 
duties, the Court could not affirm it. Instead, the Court could 
affirm only on a rationale articulated by the agency.21 
On remand, the SEC said once again that the purchases 
were prohibited.22  This time, though, it based its decision on 
a different ground: two sections of PUCHA disallowed the 
purchases.23  When the case again reached the Supreme 
Court in Chenery II, the Court affirmed based on the new 
 
 14. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 15. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962); Krent, supra note 3, at 197; 
Stack, supra note 4, at 956. 
 16. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81–85. 
 17. Id. at 85. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 88–89. 
 20. Id. at 95. 
 21. Id. at 87–88. 
 22. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947). 
 23. See id. 
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rationale.24  In doing so, the Court reiterated the lesson of 
Chenery I—that a court, when reviewing agency action, must 
base its review on a ground actually invoked by the agency.  
The reviewing court may not substitute what it considers a 
more adequate or proper basis for the agency action, because 
doing so would intrude on the domain of exclusive agency 
authority created by Congress.25 
B. Subsequent Development and Divergence in the Doctrine 
After Chenery, a series of cases modified the scope of the 
doctrine, with some variation between appellate courts.  In 
some ways, the case law expanded the doctrine’s scope, 
applying it to a broad range of administrative 
decisionmaking.  In other ways, the case law limited the 
doctrine’s scope by introducing several exceptions to the 
general rule.  These developments—particularly in a handful 
of courts, including the Federal Circuit—have cast doubt on 
the coherence and predictability of the Chenery doctrine. 
1. A Framework for Analysis 
Before turning to these changes, understanding how 
Chenery has evolved requires a brief overview of the 
framework for judicial review of agency actions.  Judicial 
review of agency actions can be understood as having two 
relevant axes that determine the form of review.  First, the 
form of review depends on the mode in which the action was 
carried out—how formal was the proceeding?  Proceedings 
fall into four categories—informal adjudication, informal 
rulemaking (called notice-and-comment rulemaking), formal 
adjudication, and formal rulemaking.  Second, the form of 
judicial review depends on the type of agency action—is it a 
finding of fact, a determination of law, or an exercise of 
 
 24. Id. at 209. 
 25. Id. at 196 (“When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but 
fundamental rule of administrative law.  That rule is to the effect that a 
reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of 
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.  If those grounds are 
inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative 
action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.  
To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside 
exclusively for the administrative agency.”). 
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judgment or discretion?26 
For each combination of mode and type of agency action, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or case law sets out 
a default standard of review that applies when a court 
reviews an agency’s action, absent alternative statutory 
provisions.27  The standard of review determines with how 
much deference a court will scrutinize an agency’s action.28  
These standards of review are often seen as the heart of 
administrative law.  But they do not capture another 
important dimension of judicial review—what will a 
reviewing court examine in deciding whether the standard of 
review is met?  The Chenery doctrine addresses this missing 
dimension.  When Chenery applies, judicial review is limited 
to the agency’s own explanation.29 
 
 
 26. Introduction to the Chapters on the Scope of Judicial Review, in A GUIDE 
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 3, at 51, 
51. 
 27. Id.  For instance, a finding of fact by an agency during a formal 
adjudication or rulemaking would generally be reviewed under the “substantial 
evidence” standard, as dictated by the APA.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).  On the 
other hand, during an informal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, a finding of fact would generally be reviewed under the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 414 (1971), and the same standard of review applies to agency policy 
decisions and exercises of discretion.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).  Questions 
of law also receive varying levels of deference depending on the type of 
proceeding, as well as on the type of legal question.  For agency interpretations 
of an unclear statute, the default deference is Skidmore deference.  Benjamin & 
Rai, supra note 12, at 295.  Skidmore deference gives an agency’s decision 
weight based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  However, if Congress has “delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and . . . the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority,” the agency interpretation of an unclear statute receives greater 
Chevron deference, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001), 
which is described in Part III.B.2.  When an agency interprets its own 
regulation, it receives Auer deference, which gives the agency interpretation 
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 28. See generally BREYER, supra note 1, at 191. 
 29. See Stack, supra note 4, at 971–72. 
MOTOMURA FINAL 8/22/2013  3:56 PM 
826 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
2. Modes of Decisionmaking: Rulemaking or 
Adjudication, Formal or Informal? 
Keeping in mind this framework for judicial review of 
agency action, we can now turn back to the post-Chenery case 
law.  The Chenery case itself involved review of an agency 
decision made through formal adjudication.30  Immediately 
after the Court’s Chenery decisions, it was unclear whether 
the principle would apply to other modes of agency 
decisionmaking.31  Because the Chenery decision articulated 
the significance of the record for judicial review, it might have 
been expected that the Supreme Court would restrict its 
application to formal, on-the-record administrative 
proceedings.32  Despite this initial uncertainty, subsequent 
cases gradually expanded Chenery’s application to informal 
agency decisionmaking.33  In the early 1970s, the Supreme 
Court applied the Chenery principle to informal 
adjudications,34 and in 1983, it first applied the principle to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.35  Thus, the Chenery 
principle is now treated as a general rule of judicial review, 
applying to all modes of agency decisionmaking.36 
3. Types of Decisionmaking: Policy, Fact, and Law 
With respect to the type of agency decisionmaking 
(policy, fact, or law), it is less clear when Chenery applies.  In 
the Chenery case itself, the agency based its decision on an 
 
 30. Id. at 962.  Although Chenery I was decided before the APA was 
enacted, the procedure followed by the SEC fell within what would become the 
APA’s definition of formal adjudication.  Id. at 962 n.29. 
 31. Id. at 962. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419–20 (1971); see Stack, supra note 4, at 
962. 
 35. See Stack, supra note 4, at 962–63 (discussing and citing cases applying 
Chenery to notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 36. See id. at 956, 962 (“The principle now applies in review of every form of 
agency action, from agency rulemaking to informal adjudication, as well as in 
review of all manner of deficiencies in agency fact-finding and insufficient 
statements of reasons, not merely to agency reliance on legally erroneous 
grounds.”  Id. at 956.  “[T]he Supreme Court has extended the demand for 
explicit reason-giving to virtually every form of agency action and every 
conceivable type of deficiency in an agency’s stated justification for its action.”  
Id. at 962.). 
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erroneous legal conclusion—an incorrect interpretation of 
fiduciary duties.37  Yet, the jurisprudence regarding Chenery 
seems to have gone in the opposite direction.  Courts and 
scholars agree that Chenery applies to findings of fact and 
exercises of judgment or discretion, but they disagree on 
whether and to what extent it applies to questions of law.  
Although most courts apply Chenery to questions of law,38 
some courts and scholars have concluded that Chenery does 
not apply to questions of law.39 
 
 
 37. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88–89 (1943); Stack, supra note 4, at 956. 
 38. Cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008 (discussing the scope and 
limitations of Chenery’s application).  
 39. See, e.g., HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr. v. 
Shalala, 164 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Court also explicitly limited 
[the Chenery] ruling to cases in which an agency fails to make a necessary 
determination of fact or policy.”); Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Supreme Court clearly limited Chenery to situations in which 
the agency failed to make a necessary determination of fact or of policy.”); Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 784 F.2d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“Generally, a reviewing court may only judge the propriety of an agency 
decision on the grounds invoked by the agency.  However, the court is not so 
bound when, as here, the issue in dispute is the interpretation of a federal 
statute.” (citation omitted)); N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) (“We do not, however, perceive there to 
be a Chenery problem in the instant case because the question of interpretation 
of a federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which an administrative 
agency alone is authorized to make.’ ” (quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947))); Milk Transport, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 190 F. Supp. 
350, 354–55 (D. Minn, 1960) (“The first Chenery case did hold that a reviewing 
court must judge an agency order only on the grounds on which the order was 
based, but the court limited this rule to determinations which the 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make. . . . We are interpreting the 
scope of a federal statute and this task is not peculiar to an administrative 
agency.”); Krent, supra note 3, at 204 (“[T]he Chenery doctrine applies to the 
policy and factual bases that support an agency action . . . .”); Patrick J. Glen, 
“To Remand, or Not to Remand”: Ventura’s Ordinary Remand Rule and the 
Evolving Jurisprudence of Futility, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 2 (2010) 
(stating that with the Chenery decision, “the Court gave voice to what would 
become the courts’ deferential stance to agency factual findings and 
discretionary determinations, and its continuing authority to review legal and 
constitutional claims de novo”).  Professor Stack cites some courts as taking this 
approach, but he argues that it is an implausible position, at least when 
Chevron deference applies.  Stack, supra note 4 at 1008–10 (“Some courts have 
concluded that the Chenery principle applies only to lapses in agency factfinding 
or policymaking rationales but does not extend to an agency’s failure to 
articulate the basis for its interpretation of statutes that the agency 
administers.  Regardless of whether that was a plausible position prior to 
Chevron, it does not make sense once Chevron is in the picture.”  Id. at 1008.). 
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This divergence of views seems to originate from three 
statements by the Supreme Court in the original Chenery 
cases.  In Chenery I, the Court stated that a court cannot 
intrude into an agency’s domain “[i]f an order is valid only as 
a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone 
is authorized to make and which it has not made.”40  In 
Chenery II, the Court made a similar statement, describing 
the rule of Chenery I as applying to a “determination or 
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized 
to make.”41  Some courts and scholars view these statements 
as excluding determinations of law from Chenery’s scope 
because legal determinations and interpretations of statutes 
are not exclusively entrusted to agencies.  For instance, in 
North Carolina Commission of Indian Affairs v. U.S. 
Department of Labor, the Fourth Circuit relied on the 
statement from Chenery II in concluding that Chenery did not 
prevent the court from affirming the administrative law 
judge’s (ALJ) order based on a statutory interpretation that 
differed from the ALJ’s interpretation.42  The court stated: 
“We do not . . . perceive there to be a Chenery problem in the 
instant case because the question of interpretation of a 
federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’ ”43  The 
Federal Circuit, in In re Comiskey, similarly relied on the 
statement from Chenery I to limit the rule’s scope.44 
The third statement that courts have cited in limiting 
Chenery’s scope comes from Chenery I.  The Court stated that 
it was not “disturb[ing] the settled rule” from Helvering v. 
Gowran that an appellate court must affirm a lower court’s 
decision reaching the correct result “ ‘although the lower court 
relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason,’ ” 
explaining that “[i]t would be wasteful to send a case back to 
a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already 
made but which the appellate court concluded should 
properly be based on another ground within the power of the 
 
 40. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88. 
 41. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196. 
 42. Comm’n of Indian Affairs, 725 F.2d at 240. 
 43. Id. (quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196).  The district court in Milk 
Transport also relied on this statement in declining to apply Chenery to a 
question of law. See Milk Transport, 190 F. Supp. at 354–55. 
 44. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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appellate court to formulate.”45 
Although this statement quite plainly refers to review of 
decisions of courts, not of agencies, courts have pointed to this 
language as a clear statement that Chenery does not apply to 
agencies’ determinations of law.  In Arkansas AFL-CIO v. 
FCC, for example, the Eighth Circuit quoted this language to 
support its statement that “the Supreme Court clearly limited 
Chenery to situations in which the agency failed to make a 
necessary determination of fact or of policy.”46  The Federal 
Circuit, in In re Comiskey and In re Aoyama, similarly 
referred to this language regarding lower court decisions in 
explaining why Chenery did not apply to a determination of 
law.47  In Comiskey, the Federal Circuit described the 
Supreme Court as having “made clear that a reviewing court 
can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal ground 
not relied upon by the agency if there is no issue of fact, 
policy, or agency expertise.”48 
The reliance on this third statement to exclude questions 
of law from Chenery’s scope is analytically questionable.  
Though the Supreme Court stated later in the same 
paragraph that “[l]ike considerations govern review of 
administrative orders,”49 the Court was there referring to a 
limitation of the principle from Gowran: that the appellate 
court, in reviewing a lower court, still may not take the place 
of the jury.50  Thus, the better reading of the Court’s 
statement in Chenery I is that the appellate court, just as it 
cannot intrude into the jury’s domain by becoming a 
factfinder, cannot intrude into the agency’s domain when 
reviewing an agency’s action.  While the Supreme Court’s 
language may leave room for argument about what 
constitutes the agency’s domain, it is a misreading of Chenery 
to say that the motivations behind Gowran similarly apply to 
review of agency decisions, or that the Court encouraged a 
reviewing court to affirm an agency decision on a new legal 
 
 45. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 
238, 245 (1937)). 
 46. Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 47. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Comiskey, 554 F.3d 
at 974. 
 48. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974. 
 49. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88. 
 50. See id. 
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ground. 
Even if the first two statements from Chenery I and II 
lend some support to the narrower view of the doctrine, that 
view seems at odds with the original facts of Chenery, since 
that case involved a legal error by the SEC.51  Moreover, 
declining to apply Chenery to questions of law is inconsistent 
with other characterizations of the doctrine by the Supreme 
Court in dicta.  In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, for 
instance, the Court cited Chenery I for the proposition that 
“[i]f a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted 
the law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the 
case.”52 
In contrast to the courts and scholars who believe 
Chenery is limited to questions of fact and policy, most others 
view Chenery more broadly.53  Under this interpretation, 
Chenery applies to most questions of law, thus limiting a 
court’s rationales for affirmance in more cases.  These courts 
and scholars read Chenery II’s statement that its principle 
applies to a “determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make”54 to be a 
much less substantial limitation on Chenery’s scope.  They 
interpret the language to mean that Chenery does not apply 
to interpretations of statutes that are not committed to that 
 
 51. One court taking the narrower view of Chenery, however, reframed the 
agency’s error in the original case.  The Eighth Circuit, in discussing the facts of 
Chenery in Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, described the Supreme Court as unable 
to affirm the SEC’s decision not because it had made an erroneous legal 
determination, but rather because the SEC had failed to make the subsidiary 
factual findings that underlay the legal determination.  The Eighth Circuit 
described the SEC as having “made no factual findings with regard to misuse of 
the fiduciary position, honesty, fair dealings, or fair pricing.  Thus, the SEC 
recited no factual grounds for the decision it made.”  AFL-CIO, 11 F.3d at 1440.  
The Eighth Circuit repeated this view of the SEC’s error five years later.  See 
HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hospital and Rehabilitation Center v. Shalala, 
164 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 52. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998). 
 53. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs, 
482 U.S. 270, 291 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[W]hen an agency explains 
that it has denied a petition for reopening based on its understanding of the 
underlying statute, a reviewing court may only uphold the agency decision if 
that reasoning withstands review. . . .  If the court of appeals finds legal error, it 
must remand the case to the agency . . . .  This is the lesson of Chenery and its 
progeny . . . .”); cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008–13 (discussing the scope 
and limitations of Chenery’s application). 
 54. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
MOTOMURA FINAL 8/22/2013  3:56 PM 
2013] RETHINKING THE CHENERY DOCTRINE 831 
 
particular agency’s discretion—for instance, the APA—but 
that it otherwise generally applies to interpretations of the 
agency’s enabling statutes when the language is ambiguous.55 
Even when courts interpret Chenery’s scope broadly, 
however, it is worth noting that they do not apply it in all 
applicable situations.  Courts have developed several 
exceptions that soften the doctrine’s application in cases 
where the costs of remand seem to significantly outweigh the 
benefits.56  The “harmless-error” doctrine says that a case 
should not be remanded under Chenery “when a mistake of 
the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on 
the procedure used or the substance of the decision 
reached.”57  Another exception applies when the agency’s 
decision is of “less than ideal clarity” but “the agency’s path 
may reasonably be discerned.”58  Courts have also applied an 
exception when agency action is statutorily compelled, and 
thus remand would be “but a useless formality.”59 
II. THE CHENERY DOCTRINE IN APPEALS OF PATENT DENIALS 
Broad variation in courts’ interpretations of the Chenery 
doctrine and in the administrative decisionmaking to which 
Chenery is applied makes it difficult to study the doctrine 
across different areas of law and different courts.  In this 
Article, I undertake a more focused analysis of Chenery’s 
application in Federal Circuit review of patent denials by the 
PTO.  Focusing on one court and one substantive area of law 
 
 55. See Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Most . . 
. decisions apply Chenery during analysis involving Chevron’s second step . . . .  
That is the proper place for Chenery considerations to come into Chevron 
analysis.”); Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(stating that the principle of Chenery “applies as well to our review of statutory 
interpretations under the second prong of Chevron”); Stack, supra note 4, at 
965–66, 1008–09. 
 56. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 613 (describing the “ ‘soften[ing] in [the 
rule’s] application” (quoting 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 14:29, at 130 (2d ed. 1980))); cf. Note, Rationalizing Hard Look 
Review After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1919–21 (discussing a weak form of the 
Chenery rule and making a proposal for a similar “not particularly rigorous” 
conception of Chenery). 
 57. Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 
(1964). 
 58. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 
(1974). 
 59. Friendly, supra note 5, at 210. 
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allows for direct comparisons between different instances in 
which Chenery has been addressed.  The Federal Circuit is 
particularly interesting because unlike most other courts, it 
has taken the narrower view of Chenery that distinguishes 
between issues of law and fact and thus allows for more 
active judicial review of agency decisions.  Exploring the 
Federal Circuit’s application of Chenery thus also sheds 
further light on how the doctrine mediates the balance of 
power between the Federal Circuit and the PTO, and between 
courts and agencies more generally. 
A. Statutory Provisions for Judicial Review of PTO Decisions 
Before turning to the Federal Circuit’s application of 
Chenery, it is important to understand how PTO adjudication 
of a patent application gets to the point of judicial review.  
The PTO administers the Patent Act,60 which authorizes the 
PTO to examine patent applications and issue patents for 
applications meeting the requirements set forth in the 
governing statute and regulations.61  Applications are first 
reviewed by patent examiners,62 who have training in the 
relevant area of technology.63  The examination focuses on the 
application’s claims, which define the intellectual property 
rights that the resulting patent would confer, if granted.64  If 
an examiner rejects a claim twice, the applicant can appeal 
the decision to a panel of three administrative patent 
judges.65  This panel was previously called the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),66 and was renamed 
 
 60. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 
1570 & n.122 (2011). 
 61. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION 
CONCERNING PATENTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents 
/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.pdf. 
 62. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2011). 
 63. All patent examiners have a technical undergraduate degree, and many 
have higher degrees.  Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful 
Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1506 (1995). 
 64. Claims are often analogized to the “metes and bounds” of a deed for real 
property.  ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 131 (5th ed. 2010). 
 65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 134(a) (West 2012); 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012). 
 66. The BPAI was created by merging the Board of Appeals and the Board 
of Interferences in 1984.  Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3386 (1984); Jeffrey W. 
Rennecker, Ex Parte Appellate Procedure in the Patent Office and the Federal 
Circuit’s Respective Standards of Review, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 351 
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the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in 2012.67  Like the 
decisions of most administrative agencies,68 an adverse 
decision by the Board can be appealed by the applicant to an 
Article III court.69  In appeals of such Board rejections of 
patent applications, the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction.70  In conducting its review, the Federal Circuit is 
limited to “the record before the Patent and Trademark 
Office.”71 
The Federal Circuit also reviews patent-related decisions 
by other institutions—namely on appeal from the 
International Trade Commission (ITC)72 and from district 
 
(1996). 
 67. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 7(a)(1) (2011).  The 
name change was implemented by the America Invents Act and took effect on 
September 16, 2012.  Pub. L. 112-29, § 7(e) (2011). 
 68. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 753–54 (describing that “[j]udicial review 
is sometimes authorized by an agency’s organic statute . . . [m]ost commonly, 
specific statutory provisions provide that a party may petition the federal court 
of appeals to have an order set aside,” and “in the absence of a specific statutory 
review provision applicable to the agency action in question, a person can now 
ordinarily obtain review . . . by invoking one of the general or special 
jurisdictional statutes to get into federal district court and invoking the APA as 
the basis for the court to review the legality of the agency’s actions,” and as a 
result, “[j]urisdictional problems in cases involving federal agency review have 
virtually disappeared”). 
 69. 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West 2012).  Alternatively, an applicant whose 
application is denied by the Board may file a civil action against the Director of 
the PTO in district court.  35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2012).  The venue for § 145 
actions was previously the District Court for the District of Columbia, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 145 (2006), but was changed by the America Invents Act to the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 9, 125 Stat 284, 316 (2011); 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2012); Kappos 
v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 n.1 (2012).  A § 145 action cannot be filed if the 
applicant has already appealed under § 141; by filing a § 141 appeal, the 
applicant waives his or her right to file an action under § 145.  35 U.S.C.A. 
§ 141(a) (West 2012).  A § 145 civil action is not technically an appeal, and the 
applicant can introduce new evidence that is not in the administrative record.  
Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1700–01.  If the applicant introduces new evidence on a 
disputed question of fact, the court makes de novo findings of fact based on the 
new evidence and the record, id. at 1701, rather than following the substantial 
evidence standard of review applied in Federal Circuit review of the PTO’s 
factual findings in § 141 proceedings.  Id. at 1694. 
 70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012). 
 71. 35 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 2012). 
 72. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(6) (West 2012).  Under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, the ITC carries out investigations of allegations of unfair trade practices, 
including infringement of patents.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); U.S. INT’L 
TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2009). 
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courts.73  In this Article, however, I focus on Chenery’s 
application to appeals from the PTO.  These appeals involve 
the situation classically addressed by Chenery—direct appeal 
of an agency’s decision.  Appeals from the ITC also involve 
direct review of agency decisions, and Chenery does apply.  
However, the Federal Circuit has applied Chenery in only a 
handful of patent-related ITC cases.74  The Federal Circuit 
also reviews PTO decisions through indirect routes,75 but it is 
not at all clear that Chenery should apply to these routes of 
review, and in any event, there is no Federal Circuit 
precedent applying Chenery in such cases.76  Studying the 
 
 73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2012).  In addition to reaching the 
Federal Circuit through an appeal from a district court’s decision in a § 145 
action, patent issues can also reach the Federal Circuit from a district court’s 
decision in an infringement suit.  After a patent is granted, it can be asserted by 
a patentee in a civil action for infringement.  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2012) (“A 
patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”).  In 
an infringement suit, the defendant will often use patent invalidity—in essence, 
an assertion that the PTO was wrong in granting the patent—as a defense.  See 
35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012).  In such cases, the patent has a presumption of 
validity, id., but the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.  
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).  These issues 
could also arise from an action for a declaratory judgment. 
 74. The Federal Circuit has discussed Chenery in appeals from patent-
related decisions by the ITC in the cases of Interdigital Communications, L.L.C. 
v. International Trade Commission, 690 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012), Vizio, 
Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 605 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
and in an opinion later vacated in Princo Corp. v. International Trade 
Commission, 563 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, vacated, 583 F.3d 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  It has also 
addressed Chenery in an appeal from the ITC involving trade secrets.  See 
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 75. These routes include the civil actions arising under 35 U.S.C. § 145 or 
35 U.S.C. § 281, discussed above.  See supra notes 69 and 73. 
 76. Addressing any potential role for Chenery in these appeals would 
require answering fundamental questions as to what role Chenery has in quasi-
collateral attacks on agency decisions.  It is likely that there is no doctrinal 
grounding for Chenery’s application in collateral or quasi-collateral attacks on 
agency decisions, as would be the case in § 145 and § 281 actions.  In three of 
the classic cases applying the principle of Chenery—Chenery itself, Overton 
Park, and State Farm—the agency’s decisions were challenged under statutory 
provisions for judicial review in the enabling act or APA.  See Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
34 (1983) (“The Act also authorizes judicial review under the provisions of the 
[APA] of all ‘orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle 
safety standard,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b).  Under this authority, we review today 
whether NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously . . . .”); Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410–413 (1971) (finding petitioners 
entitled to judicial review under § 701 of the APA); Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 81 
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(1943) (“The respondents . . . brought this proceeding under § 24(a) of the Act to 
review an order made by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”).  Section 
24(a) of the act provided that “ ‘[ a]ny person or party aggrieved by an order 
issued by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission . . . may obtain a review of 
such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States . . . .’ ”  
Reviewability of SEC “Orders” Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 
15 U. CHI. L. REV. 966, 967 (1948) (quoting § 24(a), 49 Stat. 834 (1935), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 79x(a) (1941)).  Appeals under § 141 of the Patent Act are similarly 
brought under a statutory provision explicitly providing for “appeal [of] the 
Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”  
35 U.S.C.A. § 141(a) (West 2012). 
     In contrast, § 145 provides that an applicant dissatisfied with the Board’s 
decision may “have remedy by civil action against the Director.”  35 U.S.C.A. 
§ 145 (West 2012).  This language is clearly distinct from a direct provision of 
judicial review, and thus the extent to which Chenery should or would apply is 
unclear.  While § 145 does not have the precise language providing for judicial 
review or direct appeal, it is not a de novo proceeding, and to the extent that no 
evidence were introduced at all, or no new evidence were introduced on a 
particular issue, the proceeding would be very similar to that under § 141.  
Thus, whether Chenery applies may depend on whether Chenery’s application is 
dependent on formal distinctions—direct versus collateral attack, or explicit 
provision of “judicial review” or “appeal” versus a “civil action”—or is dependent 
on functional ideas about the role of the court’s consideration. 
     One classic Supreme Court case applying Chenery, Burlington Truck Lines, 
did present a situation closer to a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 145.  Burlington 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).  There, the district 
court’s review of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s order was under 
statutory provisions authorizing the plaintiff to file a civil action to seek the 
federal district court to restrain the order’s enforcement.  Burlington Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Ill. 1961) 
rev’d sub nom. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156.  
This suggests that there may be a role for Chenery in civil actions under § 145.  
Ultimately, however, I think it is extremely unlikely that Chenery would apply 
in § 145 actions, at least in regard to issues on which new evidence were 
introduced. In Kappos v. Hyatt, in which the Supreme Court addressed the 
standard of review in § 145 actions where new evidence was presented to the 
district court on a disputed question of fact, the Court concluded that the 
district court “does not act as the ‘reviewing court’ envisioned by the APA,” 132 
S. Ct. 1690, 1696 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706), and that it was “not persuaded 
. . . that § 145 proceedings are governed by the deferential principles of agency 
review.”  Id. at 1697.  Although Chenery may not be part of the APA scheme, see 
infra note 253, the broader meaning of the Court’s opinion in Hyatt suggests 
Chenery would not apply.  
     It is even less likely that Chenery would apply in an action under § 281, 
which provides only that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2012).  Review of a 
patent’s validity in a § 281 action is not directly provided for at all; it is a result 
of the affirmative defense of patent invalidity in § 282.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 
2012).  Thus, considerations about formal distinctions in statutory provisions 
strongly indicate that Chenery would not apply in § 281 actions.  Furthermore, 
without serious overhaul of the current system of patent adjudication, applying 
Chenery to patent validity in § 281 actions would seem to impermissibly 
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Federal Circuit’s review of appeals of PTO patent denials 
thus provides the greatest insight into Chenery. 
B. Standards of Review Applied in Federal Circuit Review of 
PTO Decisions 
For most of the period since administrative law began to 
develop and grow, patent law has largely existed apart from 
the general body of administrative law principles.77  In 
reviewing PTO decisions, the Federal Circuit has deviated 
from administrative law in significant ways.  For instance, as 
recently as 1998, the Federal Circuit denied that the APA 
applied to its review of factual decisions by the PTO.78  The 
Federal Circuit has also repeatedly stated that it gives no 
deference to legal determinations by the PTO,79 despite 
 
diminish the property rights associated with a patent.  Cf. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) 
(“Patents . . . have long been considered a species of property.  As such, they are 
surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a 
State without due process of law.” (citations omitted)).  If a patent owner were 
only allowed to bring arguments in support of validity that had been made in 
the initial adjudication, the patent owner’s ability to defend the validity of his 
patent would be severely constrained, and the effective strength of the patent 
would be dependent on the thoroughness of the arguments made in the patent’s 
prosecution—a record that can be significantly thinner than a record in a patent 
denial.  Patents are sometimes granted with essentially no record if the 
examiner deems the claims patentable on the first review.  See Mark A. Lemley 
& Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
2, ¶ 7 (2010) (finding that 13.5% of patents were granted without any argument 
or negotiation). 
 77. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 270 (“[T]he patent law 
community has tended to pay little attention to administrative law.”); Adam 
Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2009) (“[A]dministrative lawyers did not discuss 
intellectual property, and intellectual property lawyers similarly did not discuss 
administrative law.  Throughout the twentieth century, administrative law and 
intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed off from 
each other in both theory and practice.”); Wm. Redin Woodward, A 
Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 950, 950 & fn.1 (1942) (noting that the American Bar 
Association’s proposed general revision of administrative procedure and review 
and the bill of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 
both excepted the Patent Office). 
 78. In re Zurko (Zurko II), 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 79. See, e.g., PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Obviousness is a legal conclusion that we review de 
novo.”); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This 
court reviews statutory interpretation, the central issue in this case, without 
deference.” (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 
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administrative law doctrine suggesting at least some 
deference should be given.80 
The landscape changed with the 1999 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III).81  In earlier 
stages of the litigation—Zurko I before the Federal Circuit,82 
and Zurko II before the court en banc83—the Federal Circuit 
held that factual findings by the PTO are reviewed under the 
“court/court” standard of review rather than the more 
deferential “agency/court” standard of review under the 
APA.84  On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Federal Circuit, holding that the Federal Circuit must 
review PTO decisions of fact under the standards set forth in 
the APA for review of administrative agency action.85 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko III, many 
scholars have addressed the standards of review that should 
apply to different decisions by the PTO, and whether the 
Federal Circuit is applying the standards correctly.86  But 
these analyses have largely ignored the question of what 
evidence or reasoning the reviewing court can consider in 
assessing whether the necessary standard is met.87  This, as 
 
1996))); Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[C]laim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on 
appeal.”). 
 80. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 300; infra note 263.  The Federal 
Circuit has also given decisions by the ITC less deference than it may be due 
under general administrative law principles.  See generally Kumar, supra note 
60 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s failure to grant the ITC Chevron deference 
and arguing that the ITC’s patent validity and enforceability decisions should 
be granted Chevron deference). 
 81. Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III), 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 82. In re Zurko (Zurko I), 111 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 83. Zurko II, 142 F.3d at 1449 (“We believe section 559 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act permits, and stare decisis warrants, our 
continued application of the clearly erroneous standard in our review of these 
fact-findings.”). 
 84. Zurko III, 527 U.S. at 153–54. 
 85. Id. at 152. 
 86. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12; William J. Blonigan, Road 
Under Construction: Administrative Claim Interpretations and the Path of 
Greater Deference from the Federal Circuit to the Patent Office, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 
415 (2007); Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron 
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Dennis J. Harney, The Obvious Need for 
Deference: Federal Circuit Review of Patent and Trademark Office 
Determinations of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61 
(2002). 
 87. The exception is the recent article by Professor Kumar, supra note 5, at 
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Part I explained, is the Chenery question. 
C. Chenery’s Declared Scope in the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit’s declared rule for applying Chenery 
has not always been clear, but it now seems settled that the 
Federal Circuit adopts the narrower view of the doctrine’s 
scope.  If the question is one of fact, the court may affirm only 
on a ground articulated by the agency.  But if the question is 
one of law, the court need not remand, and it may affirm on a 
ground not previously articulated by the agency in the 
record.88  But the route to this current prevailing Federal 
Circuit view has not been straightforward. 
Soon after its creation in 1982,89 the Federal Circuit 
applied the Chenery doctrine for the first time in In re 
Hounsfield, an appeal from an application for reissue of a 
patent.90  There, the Commissioner of Patents and 
 
267–74. 
 88. In addition to articulating this law/fact divide, the Federal Circuit has 
adopted some of the exceptions to the Chenery doctrine in reviewing PTO 
denials.  In reviewing PTO decisions, the Federal Circuit has used the exception 
of harmless error once.  See In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
It has applied the exception of reasonable discernability twice.  See In re 
Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Huston 
308 F.3d 1267, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  The Federal Circuit has used the 
exception that Chenery does not apply when the outcome is dictated by statute 
in reviewing decisions by other agencies, though not in reviewing decisions by 
the PTO.  See Winters v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reviewing 
a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals). 
 89. See Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit—Origins, in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, 1982–1990, at 7–8 (1991). 
 90. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  A reissue 
application allows a patent owner to fix certain types of problems in an issued 
patent.  If, for instance, the patent owner finds a piece of prior art that 
invalidates one of her issued claims, she can submit a reissue application to the 
PTO to narrow that claim, making it valid in light of the newly discovered prior 
art.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2012); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN 
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1074 (4th ed. 2007). 
     The Federal Circuit’s predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA), Bennett, supra note 89, at 7, had invoked the Chenery doctrine 
once.  See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 
1981).  In that case, the CCPA seemingly misapplied Chenery completely, citing 
it for the proposition that “[t]he ITC’s mistaken belief that it required in 
personam jurisdiction was not determinative of the result, and its decision must 
be affirmed where the result is correct, notwithstanding its reliance on a wrong 
ground or a wrong reason.”  Id. at 986 (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1942)).  
The dissent vigorously disagreed with the majority’s use of Chenery, discussing 
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Trademarks attempted to provide a post hoc rationalization 
for the Board’s decision.91  The court rejected this attempt, 
citing Chenery,92 though the court did not specifically address 
the scope of the doctrine or why the court should apply 
Chenery in that case. 
The Federal Circuit first articulated a narrower view of 
the doctrine in 1985 in Spears v. Merit Systems Protection 
Board, a non-patent case.  In an appeal from a decision by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, the court suggested that 
Chenery was properly applied only when the agency had 
made a policy determination or exercised discretion.93  The 
court stated that “it would be wasteful to remand the case 
based on [Chenery], because any action by the MSPB would 
not involve policymaking or discretion.”94 
Despite this initial suggestion that Chenery had a 
narrowed scope, the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine with 
no such limitation for the greater part of the next decade.  
Less than five months after Spears, the court applied Chenery 
to remand a decision that turned on a question of law.  In 
reviewing a decision by the PTO to deny a requested filing 
date, the Federal Circuit cited Chenery in holding that 
“[s]ince the Commissioner’s decision rested on faulty legal 
premises, such action cannot be sustained.”95  From 1985 to 
1992, none of the Federal Circuit’s other references to 
Chenery articulated a narrow view of the doctrine.96  Instead, 
the Federal Circuit described the rule more generally with 
statements such as “[w]e are powerless to affirm an 
administrative action on a ground not relied upon by the 
 
Chenery in detail and arguing that “[n]ot even the broadest reading of 
[Chenery]” allowed the majority’s approach.  Id. at 996–98 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
 91. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324.  More details about this case can be found 
in the text accompanying footnotes 327–333. 
 92. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324. 
 93. Spears v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 766 F.2d 520, 523 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Dubost v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
 96. Among others, these opinions included Intrepid v. Pollock, 972 F.2d 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Cheney, 925 F.2d 1407, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
Timken Co. v. United States, 894 F.2d 385, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Acerno v. 
Department of Health & Human Services, 815 F.2d 680, 685–86 (Fed. Cir. 
1987); Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 806 F.2d 241, 246 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
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agency,”97 or “[w]e must review the Board’s decision on the 
grounds on which it was made.”98  In these opinions, it is 
unclear whether the court viewed Chenery’s scope more 
broadly, or whether the context simply made it unnecessary 
to discuss Chenery’s scope in more detail. 
The first suggestion that Chenery applied to questions of 
fact but not law (with no mention of whether it applied to 
policy determinations) came in Killip v. Office of Personnel 
Management in 1993, also an appeal from a Merit Systems 
Protection Board decision.99  There, the Federal Circuit stated 
that it was not bound by the general rule of Chenery because 
the decision did “not depend upon making a determination of 
fact not previously made by the Board,” and because “courts 
are free to review the interpretation of the federal statute 
authorizing an agency to act.”100  Later that year, the court 
reiterated this view using almost identical language in Cain 
v. Office of Personnel Management.101 
Since Killip and Cain, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
invoked the limitation that Chenery does not apply to 
questions of law, and thus does not limit judicial review in 
such cases.102  After restating this view several times outside 
 
 97. NEC Home Electronics, Ltd. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 743 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
 98. Drumheller v. Dep’t of the Army, 49 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 99. Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 100. Id. at 1569. 
 101. Cain v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 11 F.3d 1071, *3 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 102. The Federal Circuit has not invoked the limitation in every case 
involving Chenery, however.  In a number of cases, the court has described the 
doctrine in general terms, without indicating whether there are limitations on 
its scope.  In appeals from Board patent denials, see, for example, In re Nouvel, 
2012 WL 3716769, *4 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The Board’s judgment must be reviewed 
on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied . . . .  Alternative grounds 
supporting the Board’s decision are not considered.”); In re Daneshvar, 366 Fed. 
Appx. 171, 173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“At this stage, we are limited to reviewing the 
grounds relied on by the agency.”); In re Wheeler, 304 Fed. Appx. 867, 870 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (“Our appellate review is limited to the grounds relied on by the 
agency.”). 
     Moreover, in one appeal of a patent rejection by the Board, the Federal 
Circuit seemingly endorsed the broader view of Chenery as applying to 
questions of law.  See In re Lee, 277 F.3d at 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  In In re 
Lee, when the PTO proposed an alternative ground for affirmance on appeal 
before the Federal Circuit, the court declined to consider the alternative ground, 
quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Federal Election Commission v. 
Akins that “ ‘ [i]f a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the 
law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the case—even though the 
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the patent realm,103 the Federal Circuit first directly 
articulated this narrow view of Chenery’s scope in an appeal 
of a PTO decision in In re Comiskey in 2007.104  When the 
opinion was revised after rehearing en banc in 2009, the court 
retained its discussion of Chenery.105  In the Comiskey 
opinions, the Federal Circuit discussed Chenery in depth,106 
concluding that “Chenery not only permits us to supply a new 
legal ground for affirmance, but encourages such a resolution 
where, as here, ‘[i]t would be wasteful to send’ the case back 
to the agency . . . .”107  The Federal Circuit again stated that 
Chenery does not apply to questions of law in two other 
patent appeals from the Board in 2009,108 one in 2011,109 and 
 
agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful 
discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.’ ”  Id. at 1346 (quoting 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998)). 
 103. These decisions included Stoyanov v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 
involving review of the Board’s dismissal of appeals for lack of jurisdiction, 218 
Fed. Appx. 988, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Board argues . . . because the 
Board’s jurisdiction is a legal question not involving deference and does not 
require additional fact finding, we should affirm the Board’s decision despite its 
factual error. . . .  [W]e agree . . . .”), Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, involving 
review of a decision by the National Marine Fisheries Service, 330 F.3d 1358, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In this case, there is not a Chenery problem for two 
reasons. . . .  [W]e are not required to make additional factual findings, as was 
the case in Chenery. . . .  [W]e conclude that the agency would have reached the 
same conclusion had it addressed the legal issue on which we rest our 
judgment.”), and Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, involving review of an 
antidumping proceeding by the Department of Commerce, 95 F.3d 1094, 1101 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In the present case . . . the sole issue is one of statutory 
construction . . . .  That is not ‘a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’ ” (quoting Chenery II, 332 
U.S. 194, 196 (1947))). 
 104. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn and 
superseded on reh’g by In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Circ. 2009) (“We have 
repeatedly applied Chenery and have said that ‘[w]e may, however, where 
appropriate, affirm the [agency] on grounds other than those relied upon in 
rendering its decision, when upholding the [agency’s] decision does not depend 
upon making a determination of fact not previously made by the [agency].’ ” 
(quoting Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1993))). 
 105. See Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974. 
 106. See id. at 973–75; Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1372–73; see also supra notes 
44, 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 107. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975 (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)); 
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88). 
 108. See In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam) (“[Chenery] does not necessarily apply in full force where the 
agency decision was on a legal issue and did not involve any exercise of its 
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one in 2012, citing the discussion in Comiskey.110  The Federal 
Circuit has also applied this view of Chenery in an appeal 
from an investigation regarding patents at the ITC.111 
D. The Federal Circuit’s Application of the Doctrine 
Although the Federal Circuit now consistently articulates 
the view that Chenery applies to questions of fact but not law, 
the actual application of this approach has proven to be 
unpredictable.  Several cases in which the Federal Circuit has 
discussed Chenery illustrate two reasons why the Federal 
Circuit’s application of the doctrine has been inconsistent.  
First, whether the question before the court is one of law or 
fact depends on the level of generality with which the court 
views the question.  Second, the court is inconsistent in 
identifying the relevant question.112 
 
 
expert discretion.”); In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Because this aspect is a matter of law, it does not raise an issue of the Chenery 
doctrine . . . .”). 
 109. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Comiskey 
for the proposition that the court can “affirm the agency on grounds other than 
those relied upon in rendering its decision, when upholding the agency’s 
decision does not depend upon making a determination of fact not previously 
made by the agency” (citing Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974)). 
 110. Flo Healthcare Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1375 n.7 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 111. In Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, in an opinion later 
vacated, the court stated that Chenery did not prevent upholding the ITC’s 
decision on an alternative ground because the issue was “a legal matter well 
within the competence of an appellate tribunal to decide.”  563 F.3d 1301, 1312 
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, 616 
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 112. In this Article, I focus on questions of law and fact, not questions of 
policy or exercises of discretion.  This is because, although the Federal Circuit 
does occasionally recognize that the PTO exercises discretion, see, e.g., Star 
Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005), it is quite 
rare.  The court has stated that Chenery would apply to an exercise of discretion 
by the PTO, see POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 904, but I did not find any 
instances of the court doing so.  Professors Benjamin and Rai have described the 
Federal Circuit as having “failed to recognize policy decisions as a separate 
category of PTO behavior” and as having “extreme discomfort with a policy 
category as applied to PTO decisions,” even though it recognizes exercises of 
discretion by other agencies whose decisions it reviews.  Benjamin & Rai, supra 
note 12, at 305–06. 
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1. Inconsistency Due to Level of Generality 
One primary reason for the apparent inconsistency in 
Chenery’s application is that whether a particular question is 
one of law or fact often depends on the level of generality at 
which the court views the question.  As compared to many 
other substantive areas in which Chenery is applied, the 
relationship between law and fact in patent law is especially 
intertwined.113  The basic framework for law and fact is that 
most issues of patent validity are questions of law with 
underlying issues of fact, while patent infringement is a 
question of fact with underlying issues of law.114  Within 
statutory requirements for patent validity, issues of law with 
underlying issues of fact include: whether claims are 
patentable subject matter;115 whether claims are barred 
because the invention was already on sale or in public use;116 
whether claims are enabled117 and definite;118 whether there 
is obvious-type double-patenting;119 and whether claims are 
obvious.120  Yet, other requirements for validity are questions 
of fact, sometimes with underlying questions of law: whether 
the invention meets the utility requirement;121 whether a 
 
 113. Professors Allen and Pardo point to patent law as one of “the more 
salient areas where the law-fact distinction plays a significant role.”  Ronald J. 
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1769, 1787 (2003).  But they have a pessimistic view about the 
meaningfulness of the law/fact divide and describe Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that 
the scope of patent claims is a question of law, as “yet another demonstration of 
the analytically empty but pragmatically important concept of ‘questions of 
law.’ ”  Allen & Pardo, supra, at 1784.  They describe “legal” as meaning simply 
“judge decides” but having no more meaningful basis.  See id. at 1787. 
 114. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at 1063.  Infringement decisions are 
not made by the PTO, but by district courts, so I will not discuss the division of 
law and fact in infringement in any detail. 
 115. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 116. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 117. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 118. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 119. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 120. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 121. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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claim is anticipated;122 and whether the written description123 
and best mode requirements124 are met. 
Thus, at a higher level of generality a question may be 
one of law, but at a more specific level it may depend on a 
question of fact—or vice versa.  As a result, whether the 
Federal Circuit applies Chenery can be highly dependent on 
the level of generality at which the question is framed.  This 
makes the court’s decisions regarding Chenery sometimes 
unpredictable and seemingly inconsistent with each other. 
i. Layered Law and Fact in Obviousness Rejections 
One area of mixed questions of law and fact where the 
application of the Chenery doctrine is particularly 
unpredictable is in obviousness determinations.  An invention 
is patentable only if it is not “obvious.”125  An invention is 
obvious if it would have been obvious to a person with 
ordinary skill in the field, given the already-existing 
inventions, at the time the invention was made.126  Though 
the ultimate determination of obviousness is one of law, it 
relies on several inquiries that the Supreme Court has held to 
be questions of fact.  These include “the scope and content of 
the prior art,” the “differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue,” and “the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art.”127  Thus, if the question is framed at a more 
general level, focusing on obviousness itself, the question is 
one of law, and Chenery does not apply, leaving judicial 
review broad.  But if the question is framed at a more specific 
level, the question is one of fact, and Chenery applies, 
 
 122. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 123.  Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 124. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). The America Invents Act removed failure to comply with best mode as an 
invalidity defense, although disclosure of the best mode remains a requirement 
for obtaining a patent. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 
15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011). 
 125. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2012). 
 126. Id. at § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is 
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
said subject matter pertains.  Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”). 
 127. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
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narrowing judicial review. 
An example of the how the layering of law and fact in 
obviousness determinations can arise in a case implicating 
Chenery is the 2011 Federal Circuit decision in In re Klein.  
There, the examiner and Board had relied on five pieces of 
prior art in an obviousness rejection.128  Klein, the applicant, 
argued that these pieces of prior art could not be the basis for 
an obviousness rejection because they were not “analogous” 
prior art.129  The Federal Circuit agreed with Klein.130  On 
appeal, the PTO tried to raise a new argument for why the 
prior art was analogous, but the Federal Circuit relied on 
Chenery in rejecting the argument.131  Although the ultimate 
question of obviousness is a question of law, the subsidiary 
question of whether prior art is analogous is a question of 
fact.132  Because the Federal Circuit identified the relevant 
issue for Chenery purposes as the subsidiary factual question, 
the court applied Chenery.  If the court had instead focused 
more broadly on whether the claims were obvious—a question 
of law—it would not have applied Chenery and could have 
considered the PTO’s new arguments. 
The court’s identification of the dispositive issue as the 
subsidiary factual question, and the resulting application of 
Chenery, seems reasonable in Klein.  But in other cases, the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions about whether the Chenery 
doctrine should apply seem more tenuous.  In two patent 
rejections that were quite similar to each other, the court 
acted in different ways, applying the Chenery doctrine in one, 
and not applying it in the other.  In In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 
the Federal Circuit focused on the more general question of 
obviousness, thus concluding that Chenery did not apply 
because the issue was one of law.133  There, the Board held 
 
 128. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 129. Id. at 1350–52.  If a piece of prior art is not analogous, it cannot be 
considered in determining whether a patent is obvious.  See Innovention Toys, 
L.L.C. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Prior art is 
analogous if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or if it is “reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem” the inventor is trying to address.  Klein, 
647 F.3d at 1348. 
 130. Klein, 647 F.3d at 1350, 1352. 
 131. See id. at 1351 n.1, 1352 n.2. 
 132. Id. at 1347. 
 133. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam).  This opinion, and several others I discuss in this Article, are 
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that an application’s claims related to a bean plant were 
invalid on multiple grounds, including obviousness.134  The 
Board based its conclusion on the bean’s similarity to another 
well-known bean,135 relying on a published study and a 
declaration from a seed specialist.136  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the Board “did not explain its 
conclusion in detail” in finding the claims obvious.137  The 
court acknowledged that Chenery generally required it to 
review Board decisions based on the grounds articulated by 
the agency.138  Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
doctrine did not restrict its ability to affirm this particular 
decision, because the Board “unequivocally h[e]ld the claims 
to be obvious, which was a legal determination,” and Chenery 
did not “necessarily apply in full force where the agency 
decision was on a legal issue and did not involve any exercise 
 
unpublished.  Many Federal Circuit opinions are unpublished: from 1982 to 
2003, approximately seventy-seven percent were unpublished.  See Beth Zeitlin 
Shaw, Please Ignore this Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions 
in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1028 tbl.1(b) (2004).  In 
appeals from the PTO, approximately forty-two percent were unpublished.  Id. 
at 1027 tbl.1(a).  Before 2006, unpublished opinions could not normally be cited 
by parties before the Federal Circuit.  See id. at 1018.  But in 2006, the 
Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which bars 
courts from restricting citations to unpublished opinions issued in 2007 or later.  
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (2007).  The Federal Circuit has stated that though the 
“decision itself receives due care,” these opinions “do not represent the 
considered view of the Federal Circuit regarding aspects of a particular case 
beyond the decision itself,” and “they are not intended to convey this court’s 
view of law applicable in other cases.”  Hamilton v. Brown, 39 F.3d 1574, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1994).  It is therefore important to draw conclusions from unpublished 
opinions with care.  However, the Federal Circuit cannot be excused from 
consistent application of Chenery simply because a case is unpublished.  It must 
be held accountable for how it applies the doctrine in all cases—the court can 
encroach on agency power by substituting its own reasoning in an unpublished 
decision just as in a published one. 
 134. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 902.  The proceeding combined a 
reexamination and reissue.  Id at 901.  For an explanation of reissue, see supra 
note 90.  Reexamination allows for reconsideration of the patentability of the 
patent based on prior art patents and printed publications.  See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2209 (8th 
ed. 2001). 
 135. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 902. 
 136. Ex parte POD-NERS, L.L.C., No. 2007-3938, 2008 WL 1901980, passim 
(B.P.A.I. April 29, 2008). 
 137. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 904. 
 138. Id. 
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of its expert discretion.”139  Thus, by identifying the relevant 
question as the ultimate legal determination of obviousness, 
not as the underlying factual determinations, the court could 
supply its own explanation of why the prior art rendered the 
claims obvious and affirm the decision.140 
The Federal Circuit’s approach in POD-NERS was 
seemingly inconsistent with that of an earlier case, In re 
Thrift.  The court in Thrift similarly addressed an 
obviousness rejection, but that time the court focused on the 
underlying factual determinations, therefore concluding that 
Chenery did apply to limit judicial review.  In Thrift, the 
patent examiner rejected claims in a patent application for 
voice-activated hypermedia systems.141  The examiner 
concluded that two of the claims were obvious because the 
technique they described was “old and well known in the art 
of speech recognition as a means of optimization which is 
highly desirable.”142  The Board affirmed the examiner’s 
rejection of these claims on appeal and denied the request to 
reconsider on rehearing.143  The Federal Circuit found the 
examiner’s and Board’s conclusions insufficiently supported. 
The court stated that “the Board’s ground of rejection is 
simply inadequate on its face.”144  The rejection was faulty, 
the court explained, because it was based only on a “very 
general and broad conclusion of obviousness.”145  More 
specifically, the court critiqued the agency for not addressing 
each of the individual elements of the claims.146 
In its brief to the Federal Circuit, the PTO provided new 
justifications for affirming the Board’s rejection.  With respect 
to the first of the two claims, the PTO argued that the 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 903–04. 
 141. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  “Hypermedia” 
is “a database format similar to hypertext in which text, sound, or video images 
related to that on a display can be accessed directly from the display.”  
Hypermedia Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/hyper-media (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
 142. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1362.  The claims required that the system allow a 
user to create a specific phrase, called a “grammar,” that could be linked to a 
web address.  Id. at 1360–61. 
 143. Id. at 1362. 
 144. Id. at 1366. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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applicants had not raised their arguments before the Board in 
a timely manner, and they therefore had waived those 
arguments.147  With respect to the second claim, the PTO 
argued that one of the cited references disclosed information 
making the claim limitations obvious.148  The court, however, 
relied on Chenery to dismiss both arguments, saying that 
because the Board had not relied on these grounds for 
rejection, they could not be the basis for Federal Circuit 
affirmance.149 
The outcomes in POD-NERS and Thrift are hard to 
reconcile.  Both involved insufficiently detailed rejections for 
obviousness.  In POD-NERS, the court said that “the Board 
did not explain its conclusion in detail,”150 and in Thrift, the 
Board based its rejection on a “very general and broad 
conclusion of obviousness.”151  We might therefore expect the 
Federal Circuit to apply the Chenery doctrine in both cases 
because the underlying factual findings were unsatisfactory, 
or to apply it in neither case because the general conclusions 
of obviousness were unsatisfactory.  Instead, in POD-NERS, 
the court focused on the agency’s broad conclusion of 
obviousness, thus avoiding Chenery;152 in Thrift, the court 
focused on the lack of particular subsidiary findings, thus 
applying Chenery.153  In isolation, either approach seems 
reasonable—but the inconsistency between the two decisions 
is troubling.  Though it is certainly possible ex post to craft 
arguments for why Chenery should apply in Thrift but not 
POD-NERS, confidently predicting these outcomes would 
 
 147. Id. at 1366 & n.1; Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office at 20–26, In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 01-
1445), 2001 WL 34624101. 
 148. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1366–67. 
 149. Id. 
 150. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). 
 151. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1366. 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 139–140. 
 153. In Thrift, unlike POD-NERS, the court did not explicitly address 
Chenery’s scope and the distinction between questions of law and fact.  
Therefore, it is also possible that the court applied Chenery not because it 
identified the question as one of fact, but because it took a broader view of 
Chenery.  In a later case, however, the Federal Circuit pointed to Thrift as 
properly applying Chenery because affirmance would require factual 
determinations not originally considered by the PTO.  See In re Comiskey, 554 
F.3d 967, 974–75 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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have been quite difficult. 
ii. Federal Circuit Recognition of Layered Law and 
Fact 
Some Federal Circuit decisions involving Chenery do 
recognize implications of layered law and fact.  In In re 
Comiskey, the examiner and Board rejected the applicant’s 
claims as obvious.154  Although the agency based its decision 
on obviousness, the Federal Circuit, hearing the appeal en 
banc, requested supplemental briefing after oral argument on 
another possible ground for rejection—whether Comiskey’s 
claims described patentable subject matter.155  In his 
supplemental brief, Comiskey argued that the Federal Circuit 
could not affirm the rejection of the claims based on the 
claims’ failure to describe patentable subject matter because 
the examiner and Board had not raised that ground for 
rejection.156  But the Federal Circuit dismissed Comiskey’s 
argument.  It reasoned that although the agency had not 
addressed the issue of patentable subject matter, the court 
could nonetheless properly affirm the rejection based on it.157  
The court explained that because whether a claim is 
patentable subject matter is a question of law, Chenery did 
not apply.158  It did recognize, however, that “there may be 
cases in which the legal question as to patentable subject 
matter may turn on subsidiary factual issues.”159  The court 




 154. Id. at 972. 
 155. Id.  35 U.S.C. § 101 limits the types of things that can be patented: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012). 
 156. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 972; Appellant Supplemental Letter Brief, In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 2006-1286), 2007 WL 869874. 
 157. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975. 
 158. Id. (“It is well-established that ‘whether the asserted claims . . . are 
invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is a 
question of law . . . .’  As a question of law, lack of statutory subject matter is a 
‘ground [for affirmance] within the power of the appellate court to formulate.’ ” 
(quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) and Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943))). 
 159. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975. 
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The Federal Circuit again recognized that a legal issue 
might turn on underlying factual findings in In re Aoyama, a 
2011 decision.160  There, the court affirmed a rejection on a 
new ground that was a question of law.161 The court concluded 
that Chenery did not bar affirmance on the new ground, even 
though it might be “predicated upon ‘a determination of policy 
or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make,’ ” 
because the underlying factual determination had already 
been made in a different context.162  As in Comiskey, the court 
distinguished the case from “ ‘situations that required factual 
determinations not made by the agency.’ ”163 
Although the Federal Circuit recognized in Comiskey and 
Aoyama that a legal issue might turn on a subsidiary factual 
issue—and therefore that Chenery would apply to the broader 
legal issue—other cases suggest that the Federal Circuit does 
not always keep this complexity in mind.  For instance, recall 
that in In re POD-NERS the court said that Chenery did not 
preclude affirmance, because the Board’s determination of 
obviousness was a legal one.164  This fails to acknowledge that 
any obviousness rejection by the PTO requires a set of factual 
determinations: the scope and content of the prior art, the 
differences between the prior art and the applicant’s claims, 
and the level of ordinary skill in the art.165  POD-NERS 
reflected the type of situation described in Comiskey—a case 
in which the legal question turned on subsidiary factual 
determinations that had not been clearly articulated by the 
agency—yet the court still held that Chenery did not apply. 
iii. Layered Law and Fact in Anticipation Rejections 
It is even more clear in anticipation rejections that the 
court does not always keep these implications of layered law 
and fact in mind.  To obtain a patent, the applicant’s 
 
 160. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  For a more detailed 
discussion of this case, see the text accompanying notes 183–188. 
 161. Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1299, 1301. 
 162. Id. at 1300 (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).  The dissent 
criticized the court’s opinion as “defying the requirements for appellate review 
of agency action,” citing Chenery.  See id. at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 1299 (quoting Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974). 
 164. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). 
 165. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
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invention cannot be “anticipated.”  If every element of a claim 
was previously disclosed in a single piece of prior art—that is, 
if the invention is not new—it will be rejected as 
anticipated.166  Unlike obviousness, anticipation is a question 
of fact.167  Determining whether patent claims are 
anticipated, however, involves a two-step analysis that 
includes first construing the claims, which is a question of 
law.168  If, as the Federal Circuit recognized in Comiskey and 
Aoyama, a subsidiary issue of fact underlying a question of 
law could cause Chenery to apply, then by analogy a 
subsidiary question of law (e.g., claim construction) surely 
could not insulate the broader question of fact (e.g., 
anticipation) from the Chenery doctrine. 
Yet, the Federal Circuit has used a claim construction 
issue within an anticipation rejection to avoid the constraints 
of Chenery.  The applicant in In re Skvorecz applied for 
reissue of a patent for a wire chafing stand, a device used by 
caterers to hold hot pans of food.169  The examiner rejected 
one of Skovrecz’s claims as anticipated by another patent, and 
the Board affirmed the rejection.170  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the Board’s reasoning.  The court held that 
the Board had misunderstood the invention in the other 
patent, and that it did not in fact have all of the elements in 
Skovrecz’s claim.171  In response, the PTO argued that there 
 
 166. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2012); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at 
1060–61. 
 167. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 168. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Cybor Corp. 
v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]e therefore 
reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo 
on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim 
construction.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he interpretation and construction of patent claims, which 
define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law 
exclusively for the court.”). 
 169. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 1265–66. 
 171. Id. at 1267.  The claim at issue in Skovrecz’s patent required that each 
of the stands’ wire legs have lateral offsets near the rim, allowing the stands to 
nest closely when stacked, without becoming wedged together and difficult to 
separate.  See id. at 1263, 1265.  The other patent (the “Buff patent”) appeared 
to have several legs without any lateral offsets, but the examiner and Board 
concluded that these were not actually “legs” but “transverse members.”  
Therefore, the Buff patent could anticipate Skvorecz’s claims without these 
elements having offsets.  Id. at 1267.  The Federal Circuit held on appeal that 
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was an alternative way to construe the claim that would 
support rejecting it as anticipated.172  Although the PTO was 
suggesting a new reason for affirmance, the Federal Circuit 
said Chenery did not bar the new reason.173  The court stated 
that such post hoc rationalization “d[id] not raise an issue of 
the Chenery doctrine” and was thus permissible, because 
claim construction is a matter of law.174  Thus, by focusing on 
the subsidiary legal issue of claim construction, the court 
circumvented the constraints of Chenery, even though that 
legal issue bore ultimately on a question of fact.175 
As I have illustrated above, by limiting Chenery to 
questions of fact and not applying it to questions of law, the 
Federal Circuit has introduced inconsistency in its 
application.  Of course, it is not unique to patent law or the 
Federal Circuit that identifying an issue as one of law or fact 
is a difficult task or one that is susceptible to manipulation.  
Ambiguities similar to those I highlight here will also appear 
in other courts that make a distinction between law and fact 
when deciding whether to apply Chenery.  Indeed, the 
potential for this problem can be seen in interpretations of 
the original situation in Chenery itself.  While most courts 
and scholars describe the SEC’s error as one of law,176 the 
error has also been reframed more narrowly as one of fact.  In 
Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit focused on the 
agency’s lack of subsidiary factual findings “with regard to 
misuse of the fiduciary position, honesty, fair dealings or fair 
 
the “transverse members” in Buff were in fact legs.  Because these legs did not 
have the offsets required in Skvorecz’s claims, the Buff patent did not anticipate 
the claims.  Id. at 1267–68. 
 172. Id.  The PTO argued that the language of Skvorecz’s claim could be 
construed such that not all legs were required to have an offset: “[C]laim 1 is 
anticipated because it can be construed to include wire legs without offsets, 
because the claim uses the open-ended transition term ‘comprising.’ ”  Id. 
 173. However, the court rejected the argument on the merits.  Id. at 1268. 
 174. See id. at 1267 n.2. 
 175. It could be argued that because the finding of anticipation had already 
been made by the Board, albeit on a different basis, the finding of fact in 
Skvorecz was not a new finding of fact, and therefore was not barred by 
Chenery.  That argument conflicts with the purposes of Chenery, however, see 
infra Part III.A, since the Board’s finding of anticipation was based on a 
misunderstanding of the other patent. 
 176. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 4, at 964 (“Nor have courts cabined Chenery’s 
application to the particular deficiency at issue in Chenery—agency reliance on 
a legal error.”). 
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pricing,”177 instead of describing the agency’s error as an 
erroneous legal conclusion.  That said, these problems of 
framing are exacerbated in patent law by the especially 
complicated nature of the distinction between law and fact. 
2. Inconsistency Due to Identification of the Relevant 
Issue 
In addition to the unpredictability in Chenery’s 
application due to whether questions are framed more 
generally or specifically, the Federal Circuit’s opinions reveal 
another troubling inconsistency: they seem to disagree on 
what the dispositive issue is.  The Federal Circuit has 
described the relevant issue—that is, the issue that must be 
identified as one of law or of fact—as both the determination 
at the agency level and as the potential alternative reasoning 
on which the Federal Circuit might affirm the decision. 
This difference is an important one.  Suppose that the 
PTO rejected a claim for a reason that was unambiguously a 
question of fact.  Then, on appeal, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the PTO was wrong on the finding of fact, but 
the court had an alternative rationale that was clearly a 
question of law to affirm the rejection.  Would Chenery apply 
because the original error was a question of fact?  Or would 
Chenery not apply because the Federal Circuit’s alternative 
rationale was a question of law? 
In this scenario, most of the Federal Circuit’s opinions 
point to the alternative rationale as the relevant issue for 
deciding if Chenery applies.  In Killip v. Office of Personnel 
Management, the Federal Circuit stated that it could affirm 
on grounds not relied upon by the agency “when upholding 
the Board’s decision does not depend upon making a 
determination of fact not previously made by the Board.”178  
This approach focuses on the potential alternative rationale 
for affirmance.  Similar is In re Comiskey, where the Federal 
Circuit held that Chenery did not restrict its ability to affirm 
the rejection on a different basis—patentable subject 
matter—because “ ‘ whether the asserted claims . . . are 
invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 
 
 177. Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 178. Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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U.S.C. § 101, is a question of law.’ ”179  There the court focused 
not on the error the PTO made, but on the new reasoning 
being proposed to affirm the decision.  The court took a 
similar approach in In re Skvorecz, where the court said that 
Chenery did not apply because the post hoc rationalization 
provided by the PTO—claim construction—was a matter of 
law.180 
Yet the Federal Circuit has also taken the opposite 
approach, focusing instead on the PTO’s error as the 
dispositive question for the law/fact distinction.  In In re 
POD-NERS, the court clearly rested its reasoning on the 
error by the agency in concluding that Chenery did not 
restrict its ability to supply a new reason for affirmance.181  It 
stated: “In ruling that the claims would have been obvious, 
the Board did not explain its conclusions in detail.  It did, 
however, unequivocally hold the claims to be obvious, which 
was a legal determination.  In these circumstances, [SEC v. 
Chenery] does not preclude us from affirming the Board” 
because “the agency decision was on a legal issue and did not 
involve any exercise of its expert discretion.”182 
The importance of consistency in identifying the relevant 
issue can be seen in the situation presented in In re 
Aoyama.183  There, the Board rejected two claims based on 
anticipation.184  The Federal Circuit stated that the claims 
 
 179. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting AT&T Corp. 
v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 180. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The Federal 
Circuit also took this approach in In re Aoyama, discussed in notes 183–188 
infra and the accompanying text. 
 181. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). 
 182. Id.  The Federal Circuit similarly implied that the error was dispositive 
in In re Thrift, where it said that “[h]ere the Chenery rule is implicated because 
the Board failed to provide an adequate ground for sustaining the rejection.”  In 
re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  There, however, the court did 
not make the limitation to questions of fact explicit.  The Eighth Circuit also 
pointed to the agency error as being dispositive in HealthEast Bethesda 
Lutheran Hospital and Rehabilitation Center v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 
1998).  The court stated that the ability of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to make a new legal argument before the court for the agency’s decision 
was not barred because “[t]he case before us does not involve an alleged failure 
on the part of the Secretary to make a necessary finding of fact or policy.”  Id. at 
418. 
 183. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 184. Id. at 1294. 
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were not anticipated, but instead, they were invalid because 
they were indefinite.185  Whereas anticipation is a question of 
fact, indefiniteness is a question of law.186  Should Chenery 
apply in this case?  The Federal Circuit did not end up 
applying Chenery; it said that indefiniteness (the new reason 
for affirmance) was a question of law, and therefore concluded 
that Chenery did not apply.187  But if the court had instead 
looked to the agency error, Chenery would have applied, and 
the Federal Circuit would have been forced to vacate and 
remand.188  Of course, in many cases, inconsistency in 
identifying the relevant issue has no practical effect because 
both the agency determination and the court’s alternative are 
questions of law, or both are questions of fact.189  But in cases 
 
 185. Id. at 1298.  Patent claims are required to be “definite” under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112.  In order to be definite, “ ‘one skilled in the art [must] understand the 
bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.’ ”  Personalized 
Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (quoting Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)). 
 186. See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1296; Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 702. 
 187. See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1299. 
 188. Actually, in this case, had the court looked to the agency’s error, it 
would have implicated a level-of-generality question: the Board incorrectly 
found the claim anticipated (a question of fact) because it incorrectly construed 
the claims (a question of law).  See id. at 1294. 
 189. This was true in the Zurko litigation, which I discussed earlier in Part 
II.B, on remand from the Supreme Court.  In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  There, the examiner rejected the claims as obvious, and the 
Board affirmed the rejection.  The examiner and Board relied on two references, 
finding that they either inherently or implicitly disclosed a particular limitation 
of the applicant’s claims.  Id. at 1384.  Before the Federal Circuit, the 
Commissioner conceded that neither of the references relied upon by the agency 
actually disclosed the limitation.  Id. at 1385.  (The Federal Circuit had 
previously held the limitation was not disclosed in the references when the case 
was before the court in Zurko I.  Zurko I, 111 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  
The Commissioner argued instead that the limitation could be found in four 
other pieces of prior art in the record.  Therefore, the Commission argued, the 
Federal Circuit could affirm the presence of the limitation in the prior art, and 
in turn the obviousness of the claims, based on these other references.  The 
Federal Circuit responded by refusing to affirm the rejection based on the other 
references because of Chenery.  In this case, the Commissioner attempted to fix 
the cited references’ failure to disclose the relevant limitation (a question of 
fact) by pointing to other references with that limitation (also a question of fact).  
See Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1385.  Viewed at a broader level, the Commissioner 
attempted to fix a flawed obviousness rejection (a question of law) with a valid 
obviousness rejection (also a question of law). Whether or not Chenery applied 
did not depend, therefore, on whether the court focused on the error or the 
suggested solution, as long as it viewed the error and the solution at consistent 
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like Aoyama, where the error and the suggested solution do 
not fall on the same side of the law/fact divide, the Federal 
Circuit’s inconsistency in identifying the relevant question 
adds to the unpredictability of whether the court will apply 
Chenery.190 
III. TOWARD A BETTER CHENERY 
So far, I have highlighted two sources of ambiguities in 
the Chenery doctrine.  The resulting inconsistency in 
Chenery’s application undermines the quality of 
decisionmaking in initial agency determinations and appeals.  
During agency decisionmaking, uncertainty about the 
doctrine’s scope can lead to wasted resources through 
development of records that are unnecessarily detailed or 
that set out unnecessary alternative rationales to avoid 
remand.  During appeals, unpredictable tests for Chenery’s 
application can lead to uncertainly amongst litigants 
regarding the acceptable scope of argument. 
More fundamentally, uncertainty in the application of 
Chenery is troubling because it undermines one of the 
primary functions of the doctrine.  Chenery mediates the 
separation of powers between the judicial and executive 
branches when courts review agency action.  If the 
 
levels of generality. 
 190. It is likely that there is even more inconsistency than I have outlined 
here.  I have only compared those cases where the Federal Circuit’s majority 
opinion applied Chenery or explicitly chose not to apply it.  There may be more 
inconsistency if the court is not applying (or discussing) Chenery in cases where 
it should be applied.  Indeed, there have been a number of Federal Circuit cases 
where the dissent has critiqued the court’s decision as disregarding Chenery.  
See, e.g., Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Gajarsa, J., 
dissenting) (stating, in an appeal from an interference proceeding, “[a]lthough 
the majority opinion traces through a very unclear Board decision and tries 
with a substantial degree of specificity to supply a reasoned basis for the 
Board’s decision, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there 
is no reasoned basis for the Board’s decision and there is no substantial 
evidence to support the PTO’s finding of obviousness,” citing Chenery).  For 
examples in non-patent Federal Circuit cases, see Turman-Kent v. Merit 
Systems Protection Board, 657 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting), Carley v. Department of the Army, 413 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting), Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 
424 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part), Novosteel SA 
v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting in 
part), and Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(Nies, J., dissenting). 
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application of Chenery is unpredictable or manipulable, 
courts will have greater control over when they defer to 
agency reasoning, and when they will instead substitute their 
own.  This leads to a significant danger of court encroachment 
on the power that Congress has delegated to agencies. 
While this concern applies across administrative law, it is 
particularly acute in the context of the Federal Circuit’s 
review of PTO decisions.  Even after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zurko, the Federal Circuit has continued to resist 
giving the agency the deference typically accorded to agencies 
under standard administrative law.191  For instance, the 
Federal Circuit gives PTO legal determinations no deference 
at all,192 although under standard administrative law 
principles, it should give at least Skidmore deference.193  
Scholars have also noted other contexts, besides Chenery, in 
which the Federal Circuit manipulates the divide between 
law and fact to minimize deference to the PTO.  By treating 
questions of mixed law and fact as questions of pure law, the 
court avoids applying the more deferential standard of review 
that applies to judicial review of questions of fact.194 
Given the Federal Circuit’s divergence from standard 
administrative law principles in ways that minimize 
deference to the PTO, we should be particularly wary of 
ambiguities in Chenery’s application.  With significant 
flexibility in whether it will apply Chenery or not, the Federal 
 
 191. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 232, 258–69; Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts 
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1052, 1055 (2003) (arguing that Dickinson v. Zurko will 
have “some impact” on Federal Circuit review of questions the court 
acknowledges as factual, but “it will have no impact on review in the many 
cases . . . in which the Federal Circuit refuses to recognize the existence of 
factual disputes,” and pointing to the court’s “continued resistance to 
deference”). 
 192. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 300; infra note 263. 
 194. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 264–67; cf. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial 
Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2002) 
(discussing, in the context of review of district court decisions, the Federal 
Circuit’s “alchemy” of making fact-dependent inquiries into questions of pure 
law, particularly in claim construction—which applies equally well to the 
Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO).  Professor Rai also argues that the Federal 
Circuit has shown resistance even to deference to PTO factual determinations.  
She argues that in Zurko IV, after the Supreme Court mandated review under 
the APA standards, the Federal Circuit in effect refused to apply the correct 
standard.  See Rai, supra note 191, at 1056. 
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Circuit can quietly usurp power from the agency.  In contrast 
to the more transparent reduction in deference to the agency 
when the Federal Circuit openly narrows Chenery’s scope to 
questions of fact, flexibility in how the court applies its 
declared rule is a subtle but insidious threat. 
In the following sections, I consider a number of ways 
that the Federal Circuit’s application of Chenery could be 
improved.  My first goal is to explore how Chenery’s 
application can be made more uniform and predictable.  
Uniformity in applying Chenery is the first step in protecting 
the agency’s congressionally delegated power.  Beyond 
uniformity, however, my exploration of different alternatives 
also addresses the validity of the Federal Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation of Chenery’s scope, as well as whether a 
broader or even narrower Chenery doctrine would be 
normatively desirable or doctrinally permissible. 
A. Benefits and Costs of the Chenery Doctrine 
In assessing how the ambiguities in Chenery’s application 
ought to be resolved, it is important to consider the benefits 
and costs of the Chenery doctrine in administrative law 
generally, and how persuasively they apply to review of PTO 
decisions. 
1. In Administrative Law Generally 
In administrative law generally, the benefits attributed 
to Chenery can be grouped into two categories: preserving the 
power of agencies and leading to better decisions. 
i. The Benefit of Preserving an Agency’s Power 
Chenery plays a role in preserving the power delegated to 
agencies by Congress.  Chenery protects the agency’s power 
from two potential intruders.  First, Chenery prevents courts 
from infringing on the power delegated to agencies.  In 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained that the purpose of the Chenery doctrine “is 
not to deprecate, but to vindicate, the administrative process, 
for the purpose of the rule is to avoid ‘propel[ling] the court 
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for 
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the administrative agency.’ ”195  Relying on a court-supplied 
rationale may allow affirmance of an agency’s decision in one 
instance.  But in the long term it may encroach on an 
agency’s power because “reasons have greater generality than 
the outcomes they support.”196  Thus, a reason supplied in one 
case may lead to particular outcomes in another.197 
Second, Chenery prevents the lawyers within an agency 
from infringing on the power delegated to the agency as a 
whole.198  Without Chenery, an agency’s lawyers would have 
significant control over the development of the agency’s 
decisionmaking because in litigation they would be able to 
formulate post hoc rationales before the reviewing court.199  
The result would be similar to allowing court-supplied 
rationales for affirmance; while it would benefit the agency in 
a single case, it might ultimately diminish the influence of 
the decisions reached in the normal course of agency 
decisionmaking by more technically trained agency experts.200 
ii. The Benefit of Better Agency Decisionmaking 
Chenery can also lead to better agency decisionmaking by 
influencing both who must provide rationales for decisions 
and when those rationales must be provided.201  Both effects 
may lead to better decisions.  A classic justification for the 
administrative state is that agencies are delegated power by 
Congress because they are better suited, as experts, to make 
decisions in complicated or technical areas.202  Just as agency 
decisionmakers are presumed to be better than Congress at 
making these decisions, they may also make better decisions 
than more generalist courts or lawyers within the agency.203  
 
 195. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962) 
(citing Chenery II, 322 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (citation omitted)). 
 196. Stack, supra note 4, at 997; see id. 997–1000. 
 197. See Stack, supra note 4, at 997–1000. 
 198. See Krent, supra note 3, at 200; Stack, supra note 4, at 993. 
 199. See Stack, supra note 4, at 993–94. 
 200. See Krent, supra note 3, at 199–200. 
 201. See Stack, supra note 4, at 961. 
 202. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), 
which is described in Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private 
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 
VA. L. REV. 93, 127 n.111 (2005), as the “classic statement” of the agency 
expertise justification. 
 203. It is for this reason that some judges and scholars advocate that courts 
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If agencies have the expertise to be better decisionmakers 
than generalists, agencies might be better at formulating the 
right rationales as well.  Holding agencies accountable by 
requiring them to provide the rationales for decisions, rather 
than having courts or lawyers provide them, may also result 
in better decisions because it increases political 
accountability204 and because it limits an agency’s power to 
make decisions without public scrutiny.205 
Chenery may also lead to better decisionmaking by 
requiring agencies to articulate rationales when a decision is 
made, rather than allowing post hoc rationalization.  On the 
front end, this encourages agencies to think through their 
reasoning thoroughly before making a decision,206 since they 
(or their lawyers) cannot rely on formulating convincing 
arguments if and when an appeal forces them to do so after 
the agency’s decision is made.  On the back end, Chenery 
allows for better quality-control, since a requirement that 
rationales be set forth in the record allows judges to check 
agency decisions more effectively.207  Moreover, using a post 
hoc rationale not on the agency record to affirm an agency 
decision denies interested third parties the opportunity to 
challenge the new rationale before the agency.  Remand 
because of Chenery, on the other hand, forces agencies to 
reopen the proceedings and reconsider the issue, allowing 
interested parties to have their voices heard.208 
 
 
should scrutinize the procedural mechanisms by which agencies make decisions, 
but they should not scrutinize the underlying substance on which courts are not 
experts.  See Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the 
best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative 
decisions is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of 
each decision.  Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process that assures 
a reasoned decision . . . .”). 
 204. See Stack, supra note 4, at 993–96. 
 205. See Krent, supra note 3, at 198; Stack, supra note 4, at 995–96. 
 206. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 208–09; Stack, supra note 4, at 957–58. 
 207. See Krent, supra note 3, at 199; cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 999–1000 
(suggesting that Chenery restricts the domain of reasons a court can consider, 
making “review more manageable”). 
 208. See Krent, supra note 3, at 198–99. 
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iii. Chenery’s Costs 
There are, however, significant costs to applying Chenery.  
It increases the resources that agencies expend in making 
decisions, since it creates a systematic incentive for agencies 
to formulate longer and more thorough explanations for each 
decision.209  If the decisions are still found insufficient under 
Chenery and a court remands the case back to the agency, 
this imposes further costs upon the agency (and the court 
system if the case returns on appeal).210  These effects 
significantly increase burdens on agencies, leading some 
scholars to describe Chenery as contributing to the 
“ossification” of the administrative state.211 
2. As Applied to Review of PTO Decisions 
To what extent do these benefits and costs of Chenery 
influence the answer to the normative question of how it 
should be applied in the specific context of reviewing patent 
denials? 
i. The Benefit of Protecting an Agency’s Power 
Some of Chenery’s benefits may be less pronounced in the 
review of PTO decisions as compared to other agency 
contexts.  In particular, the benefit of protecting the agency’s 
power from lawyers and courts may be less persuasive 
because Congress has delegated significantly less power to 
the PTO than to many other agencies.  The PTO does not 
have general substantive rulemaking authority.212  To the 
extent that Chenery is best “justified as an incident of 
delegation,”213 then, the doctrine may apply less forcefully to 
the PTO.  Further, if Chenery is important because “reasons 
 
 209. Stack, supra note 4, at 971, 973. 
 210. Id. at 973. 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 971, 972 n.86, 973. 
 212. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 298.  But the PTO does have broader 
procedural rulemaking authority, as well as substantive rulemaking authority, 
in a few areas.  Id. at 297–98.  See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, 
Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011) 
(discussing the PTO’s rulemaking power and the uncertain line between 
substantive and procedural power).  It also issues guidelines and policy 
statements, which are less formal rules that do not technically bind patent 
applicants.  Id. at 63–64. 
 213. Stack, supra note 4, at 1004. 
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have greater generality than the outcomes they support,”214 
this effect is not likely to infringe on the PTO’s delegated 
power if the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking 
authority in the first place.  Notwithstanding the PTO’s lack 
of substantive rulemaking authority, however, Chenery can 
still play a role in protecting the PTO’s explicitly delegated 
authority to administer the Patent Act through the 
adjudication of individual patent applications.215 
Yet, even if the PTO has power to be protected by 
Chenery, the agency may only seldom exercise that power to 
make the types of decisions in which allowing courts or 
lawyers to supply post hoc rationales would considerably 
diminish agency control.  Most PTO decisions do not have 
significant implications for future policies or patent 
adjudications.  One reason is that the vast majority of Board 
decisions do not chart new doctrinal territory, and indeed, are 
designated as nonprecedential.216  Because denials of patent 
applications are generally based on a limited and recurring 
set of reasons—obviousness, anticipation, etc.—the benefit to 
the PTO of articulating the rationales may be minimal.  
Moreover, the adjudication of each patent application is 
highly fact-specific, so in most cases, the decision on any one 
application is not particularly likely to be relevant to the 
decision on another. 
On the other hand, a number of Board decisions have 
introduced new interpretations of the law and are designated 
as precedential for future Board decisions.217  Moreover, 
 
 214. Id. at 997; see supra text accompanying notes 196–197. 
 215. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The [PTO] . . . shall be 
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents . . . .”).  Professor Stack 
suggests that the nondelegation argument for Chenery is most persuasive in the 
context of rulemaking, not adjudication.  However, he concludes that 
nondelegation justifies Chenery in adjudication because, under another 
principle articulated in Chenery II, agencies have discretion whether to proceed 
via rulemaking or adjudication.  Stack, supra note 4, at 1012.  That the PTO 
does not have this discretion to proceed via either approach may be another 
reason the nondelegation justification is not a persuasive one in patent law. 
 216. See BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & INTERFERENCES, STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 7), PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND BINDING 
PRECEDENT 1, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop2.pdf 
(“The Board annually issues a large number of opinions in appeals . . . .  Most 
opinions do not add significantly to the body of law.”). 
 217. See id. at 2–3 (identifying the criteria for Board decisions to be made 
precedential). 
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scholars have argued that the PTO exercises its discretion 
and makes policy decisions to a greater degree than the 
Federal Circuit acknowledges.  Professors Benjamin and Rai 
have criticized the Federal Circuit for failing to recognize 
policy decisions as a separate type of PTO decisionmaking,218 
and Professor Kumar has argued that it is hard to 
understand how the Federal Circuit can fail to recognize that 
decisions regarding patentable subject matter involve 
policy.219  Thus, the potential benefits of Chenery may be 
greater than initial appearances would suggest. 
ii. The Benefit of Better Agency Decisionmaking 
The idea that Chenery can improve agency 
decisionmaking by requiring articulated rationales has mixed 
applicability to PTO decisions.  As for who articulates the 
rationales, PTO examiners and administrative law judges are 
particularly good examples of technically trained experts 
making decisions in an area where lay judges and lawyers are 
significantly less qualified.220  This is particularly true for 
findings of fact.221 
Some of this expertise-based argument may be tempered 
by the expertise that the Federal Circuit gains through its 
exclusive jurisdiction in appeals from PTO patent denials.222  
This exclusive jurisdiction—combined with the court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction in appeals of district court patent 
 
 218. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 305–08. 
 219. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 272–73. 
 220. Cf. Nard, supra note 63, at 1471–72 (suggesting that the relative 
expertise of the PTO as compared to the Federal Circuit is relatively greater 
than that of the other agencies whose decisions the Federal Circuit reviews).  All 
patent examiners have a technical undergraduate degree, and many have 
higher degrees.  Id. at 1506.  Many of the administrative judges on the Board 
are former senior patent examiners, Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1459 
(Fed. Cir. 1997), and all are required to be “persons of competent legal 
knowledge and scientific ability.”  35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012).  In contrast, 
there is no such requirement for judges on the Federal Circuit.  Four of the ten 
active judges in 2012 had a technical degree.  Kumar, supra note 5, at 246. 
 221. For those issues that the Federal Circuit has labeled ones of law, but 
that are in fact highly fact-intensive, agency decisionmakers’ expertise is still 
extremely valuable.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text; cf. Rai, supra 
note 194, at 881–82 (discussing how, although claim construction is a question 
of law, judges are unlikely to be able to correctly interpret the language, and in 
most cases, “would be well-advised to turn to the testimony of experts”). 
 222. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012). 
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infringement cases223—allows the Federal Circuit to develop 
more expertise in patent law than appellate courts typically 
have in any particular area of substantive law.224  Greater 
expertise in appellate review diminishes the benefit of having 
the agency, rather than the court, formulate rationales, thus 
making Chenery less important.  But the Federal Circuit’s 
technological expertise still generally falls well short of the 
agency’s expertise.  Chenery’s effect of having rationales 
developed by agency experts thus remains a powerful reason 
for Chenery in review of PTO decisionmaking.225 
As for when rationales are articulated, Chenery probably 
has little effect.  The official guidelines for patent examiners, 
in editions published prior to either of the Supreme Court’s 
two Chenery decisions, dictated that a patent examiner 
describe his reasons for rejection and support them with 
specific references.226  Thus, the PTO practice of articulating 
the reasoning behind its decisions was in place well before 
Chenery, at least at the examiner level.  Chenery is therefore 
unlikely to be a major force in encouraging the PTO to 
articulate its basic rationales during agency proceedings, 
though it may encourage the Board to be more thorough and 
clear in its opinions.  The already existing practice of 
providing applicants with the rationales behind decisions also 
suggests that Chenery has limited benefit as far as making 
agency reasoning open to public scrutiny.  In addition, 
because patent adjudication is an ex parte process,227 
remanding to the agency to reopen proceedings does not, for 
the most part, have the benefit of allowing more interested 
parties to challenge the reasoning.228 
 
 223. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2012). 
 224. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 
(1997) (referring to the Federal Circuit’s “special expertise” in an appeal of a 
patent infringement case). 
 225. Cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 313–16 (discussing the relative 
expertise of the PTO and Federal Circuit). 
 226. C.L. WOLCOTT, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PROCEDURE 48–60 (7th ed., 
1936) (describing proper procedures for the examiner’s letter of decision). 
 227. Dennis M. de Guzman, In re Epstein: A Case of Patent Hearsay, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 805, 809 (1995). 
 228. Remanding does, however, allow the applicant to address a new 
rationale for the rejection.  If the Federal Circuit affirms a rejection on a ground 
not relied upon by the agency, the applicant loses the ability to amend his 
application in consideration of the rejection or to submit new evidence to 
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iii. Chenery’s Costs 
The PTO’s established process for adjudication of patent 
applications also means that applying Chenery may not add a 
significant burden.  The PTO is certainly severely 
backlogged—in 2012, over 1.2 million applications were 
pending.229  The average time from filing a notice of appeal to 
the Board until a decision was approximately three years,230 
with over twenty-six thousand pending appeals of patent 
applications.231  Chenery imposes direct costs on this system, 
since the Federal Circuit adds to the agency’s backlog when it 
remands a case rather than affirming it.  But the indirect 
costs attributable to Chenery may be less than they could be.  
The examiner is already required, without regard to Chenery, 
to articulate her reasoning, so applying the doctrine may not 
significantly increase the time spent on each application in 
the first instance.  Application of Chenery may, however, 
counteract pressures on the PTO to decrease its application 
backlog by cutting down the time examiners spend on each 
application, and it may force the Board to write more 
thorough opinions than it might otherwise.232 
 
overcome the rejection.  In recognition of this risk when Chenery does not bar 
the new rationale, the Federal Circuit has affirmed on a new ground and then 
still remanded to the PTO to afford the applicant these protections.  See In re 
Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 
981–82 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The dissent in Aoyama argued that these protections 
were insufficient.  See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1301 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
     There are also some ways for third parties to challenge the patentability of a 
patent application.  For instance, members of the public can file protests against 
pending applications, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 134, at Ch. 1900, and requests for 
reexamination.  See id. §§ 2203, 2612.  The America Invents Act also added a 
new provision for third party submissions.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315–16 (2011). 
 229. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 178 tbl.5 (2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf. 
 230. FY 2012 Performance Measures, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov 
/ip/boards/bpai/stats/perform/fy2012_perform.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 231. FY 2012 Process Production Report, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov 
/ip/boards/bpai/stats/process/fy2012_sep_b.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) 
(indicating that at the end of fiscal year 2012, there were 26,484 pending 
appeals of patent applications, not including appeals of ex parte or inter partes 
reexaminations). 
 232. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Board is addressing its backlog 
by writing less detailed opinions.  See Dennis Crouch, Today’s Study: The 
BPAI’s Response to Its Backlog, PATENTLYO.COM, http://www.patentlyo.com 
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The added costs of Chenery may also be less in PTO 
decisionmaking for the same reason that Chenery might not 
have a large effect on the quality of decisionmaking.  The 
PTO does not primarily make the type of decisions on which 
Chenery is thought to impose a large burden.  The 
burdensome effects of Chenery have been most criticized in 
the context of the “hard look” doctrine.233  Under “hard look” 
review, courts closely scrutinize agency regulatory policy 
decisions, checking whether an agency considered all the 
factors Congress intended it to consider, did not consider 
inappropriate factors, made a decision supported by the 
evidence in front of it, and explained why every other viable 
alternative was not pursued.234  In contrast, most of the PTO’s 
patent adjudications involve a limited scope of considerations 
and possible outcomes, and its decisions are rarely recognized 
as policy decisions or as involving exercises of discretion that 
would require hard look review.235  That said, because the 
PTO may exercise its discretion more than the Federal 
Circuit recognizes,236 there may in fact be more situations 
where Chenery could be a burden. 
iv. Chenery’s Role in Mediating Power Between the 
Federal Circuit and the PTO 
More broadly, Chenery’s scope affects the Federal 
Circuit’s power to shape the development of substantive 
patent law.  In re Comiskey is one of the best illustrations of 
this effect.  Recall that in Comiskey, the PTO rejected the 




the number of words in each published ex parte merits decision by the Board in 
February 2009, January 2010, and January 2011, and finding that the mean 
number of words dropped from approximately 3,000 words per opinion in 2009 
to 2,000 words per opinion in 2011, and that the median number of words in 
2009 was sixty percent more than the number in 2011, and finding that 
controlling for other variables did not reduce the effect). 
 233. See Stack, supra note 4, at 972; see also Note, Rationalizing Hard Look 
Review After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1913. 
 234. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review 
After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1913–14. 
 235. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 305–06. 
 236. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit upheld the rejection based on unpatentable subject 
matter.237  Professor Eisenberg has suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an earlier case 
involving patentable subject matter238 put the Federal Circuit 
on notice: after a long period of not interfering with the 
Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of patentable subject 
matter, the Supreme Court might be entering the arena.239  
Professor Eisenberg describes the Federal Circuit’s request 
for supplemental briefing and affirmance on patentable 
subject matter as reflecting the court’s “eager[ness] for an 
opportunity to address the issue of patentable subject matter 
ahead of the Supreme Court”240 during a period of uncertainty 
about the scope of patentable subject matter.  Limiting 
Chenery to questions of fact allowed the Federal Circuit to 
enter the patentable subject matter debate, even though the 
issue had not come up at the agency below.  As a result, the 
Federal Circuit could shape substantive patent law without 
the involvement of the PTO.  If Chenery had applied, the 
power to raise the issue would have remained in the first 
instance with the PTO.241 
To the extent that a desire for greater uniformity in 
patent law motivated the Federal Circuit’s creation,242 
 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 154–158. 
 238. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 
(2005).  There, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
claims to a method of diagnosing a vitamin deficiency covered patentable 
subject matter.  The writ of certiorari was later dismissed as improvidently 
granted.  Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 
(2006). 
 239. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?  
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. 
RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 13 (2012). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Of course, the Federal Circuit also shapes substantive patent law 
through appeals from district court decisions involving issued patents.  So even 
if Chenery significantly limited the Federal Circuit’s power in appeals from the 
agency, because appellate courts can affirm district court decisions on grounds 
not articulated by the lower court, see Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 
(1937), the Federal Circuit’s power would still be considerable. 
 242. Before the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, district court patent 
cases could be appealed to the regional circuit court.  Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and 
En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 804 (2010).  This system contributed 
to two perceived problems: the regional circuits’ dockets were overcrowded, and 
there was significant variation in patent law among the circuits, as well as 
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Chenery thus seems to stand in the way.243  On the other 
hand, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s mandate 
justifies intrusion into the congressional delegation of patent 
adjudication to the PTO.  The congressional mandate was 
largely intended to shift power over patent law from the 
regional circuits to the Federal Circuit—not away from the 
PTO.244  Indeed, Professor Kumar has criticized the Federal 
Circuit’s “heavy-handed review” in Comiskey as violating the 
separation of powers by intruding upon the power granted to 
the PTO by Congress.  She argues that such review transfers 
power from a politically accountable agency to a court whose 
decisions are insulated from review except by the Supreme 
Court.245 
I believe, however, that it is not entirely clear that a 
narrow Chenery doctrine per se violates the separation of 
powers as applied to the PTO.  The PTO has significantly less 
power than many other agencies, particularly in that it lacks 
substantive rulemaking power and receives less deference on 
legal determinations than other agencies.246  As such, it may 
not warrant the full range of protection that Chenery typically 
provides agencies, as I discuss in more detail below.247  But it 
is more clear that when Chenery’s ambiguities allow the court 
to manipulate the doctrine to further minimize deference, 
that violates the separation of powers.  I therefore turn next 
to several possible ways to reduce the unpredictable and 
manipulable aspects of applying Chenery.  Because most of 
 
between the circuit courts, the CCPA, and the PTO.  There was widespread 
forum shopping and significant uncertainty in how different forums would 
adjudicate the rights of patent owners.  Id. at 805; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 827, 828 (2010). 
 243. Cf. Kumar, supra note 5, at 273 (“The In re Comiskey decision has 
arguably allowed the Federal Circuit to maintain uniformity in patent law.”). 
 244. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989) (describing the problems 
motivating the Federal Circuit’s creation: (1) that the PTO and Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals could develop their own views of patent law, but 
could not impose them on the other courts; (2) that patent law varied widely 
across the circuits, leading to rampant forum shopping and uncertainty about 
the value of a patent; and (3) overloaded dockets in appellate courts). 
 245. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 273–74. 
 246. See infra text accompanying notes 271–277 (discussing how legal 
determinations in patent denials do not receive Chevron deference). 
 247. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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these approaches involve adjusting Chenery’s scope, in 
discussing them, I also explore just how much protection 
under Chenery PTO decisions should receive given both 
doctrinal constraints and normative goals. 
B. Increasing the Predictability of Chenery’s Application 
In the following sections, I address two types of 
approaches to achieving greater predictability in Chenery’s 
application.  The first type would minimize the 
inconsistencies that arise due to the Federal Circuit’s rule for 
Chenery’s application relying on unpredictable 
characterization of the relevant issue as law or fact.  One 
such solution would be to eliminate the need for line-drawing 
by either never or always applying Chenery, regardless of 
whether the question is one of law or fact.  An alternative 
solution of this type would be to clarify both the dispositive 
question and how to characterize it as law or fact.  A second 
type of approach would break down the Chenery doctrine into 
its different functions, rather than rely on the distinction 
between law and fact.  I ultimately conclude that solutions of 
the second type are best aligned with the underlying purposes 
of Chenery and existing administrative law doctrine. 
1. Narrowing Chenery’s Scope 
The application of Chenery might be made more 
consistent by eliminating the need for line-drawing by either 
never applying Chenery, or always applying it, regardless of 
whether the question is one of law or fact.  I first consider not 
applying it at all.  Of course, in the context of most agency 
decisions, never applying Chenery would obviously contradict 
Supreme Court precedent.  But is there an argument that the 
PTO is different? 
In the context of the PTO, adopting this approach would 
allow the Federal Circuit to affirm the PTO’s decision on any 
rationale supported by the record, regardless of whether the 
agency had articulated that rationale.  The approach would 
likely be permissible as a matter of statutory authority.  The 
patent statutes themselves do not require that Chenery be 
applied.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 144, the Federal Circuit must 
review PTO decisions on appeal based on “the record before 
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the Patent and Trademark Office.”248  Reviewing “on the 
record” simply means that the review must be based on the 
information in the record; new information cannot be brought 
in.  The statute does not state that the court’s reasoning must 
be restricted to the reasoning relied upon in the record before 
the agency.249 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko III, 
however, it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit could stop 
applying Chenery altogether.  Recall from Part II that under 
Zurko III, PTO decisions are subject to Federal Circuit review 
under the standards for review of administrative agency 
action set forth in the APA.250  It is true that Zurko III did not 
actually encompass the requirement that Chenery apply to 
questions of fact in patent.  The Court’s specific holding was 
that APA § 706 applies to review of findings of fact, not that 
the entire APA scheme applies.251  And even if it had held 
that the entire APA scheme applied, it is not clear that this 
holding would have encompassed Chenery.  Though some 
cases have suggested that Chenery has its origins in the 
scheme set up by the APA,252 Professor Stack has argued that 
Chenery cannot be justified as an APA requirement.253 
 
 248. 35 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 2012). 
 249. While the record requirement might at first appear to be the same as 
Chenery for questions of fact, that is not necessarily the case.  For instance, 
suppose the Board found the claim to be anticipated (a question of fact) based on 
the rationale that patent X disclosed all the limitations (also a question of fact).  
Suppose that elsewhere in the record the Board stated that patent Y had all the 
limitations of patent X, but the Board did not explicitly rely on patent Y’s 
anticipation as a rationale for the finding of anticipation.  If the Federal Circuit 
found that patent X did not in fact anticipate the claims, but patent Y did, that 
rationale for affirming the anticipation rejection would be based entirely on the 
record but would not pass muster under Chenery (though a reasonable court 
might apply one of the exceptions). 
     Despite the requirement that the Federal Circuit base its review on the 
record, it does not always do so.  See William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil, 
Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000) (discussing how the court sometimes 
“lose[s] track of the important distinction between trial and appellate roles”). 
 250. Zurko III, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
 251. Id. at 152. 
 252. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 
(1998) (citing to Chenery, among other cases, as part of the “scheme of ‘reasoned 
decisionmaking’ ”  established by the APA); Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. NLRB, 309 
F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 253. See Stack, supra note 4, at 974–75 (arguing that Chenery cannot be 
justified as an APA requirement, either based on the APA’s requirement of 
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Although the application of Chenery appears to be beyond 
the precise holding of the Supreme Court in Zurko III, the 
decision has been described as a “symbolic” one.254  The Zurko 
III Court emphasized “the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative 
action.”255  It would certainly be at odds with Zurko III to 
conclude that the PTO is so different from other agencies that 
a major principle of administrative law does not apply to it at 
all.  Such a conclusion would give the Federal Circuit 
significantly more power in reviewing the PTO than courts 
have in reviewing other agencies, and it would 
correspondingly give the PTO much less power than other 
agencies.  Given Congress’s delegation of power to adjudicate 
patent applications to the PTO,256 failing to protect even 
factual findings by the PTO on judicial review would seem to 
contravene not only Zurko but also congressional intent.  It 
would also mean losing the benefit of Chenery where that 
benefit is likely large—when technically trained experts make 
determinations of fact during the patent examination process. 
2. Broadening Chenery’s Scope 
As an alternative to not applying Chenery, courts might 
instead broaden its application to both questions of law and 
fact.  While the Federal Circuit and a few other courts have 
held that Chenery does not apply to questions of law, most 
courts and scholars have not considered the doctrine to be so 
limited.257  One scholar has argued that the Federal Circuit’s 
 
reason-giving for action or based on the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review). 
 254. Kerr, supra note 9, at 128. 
 255. Zurko III, 527 U.S. at 154. 
 256. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The [PTO] . . . shall be 
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents . . . .”). 
 257. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) (“If a 
reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside 
the agency’s action and remand the case—even though the agency (like a new 
jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach 
the same result for a different reason.” (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 87 
(1943))); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 
270, 291 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If the court of appeals finds legal 
error, it must remand the case to the agency . . . .  This is the lesson of Chenery 
and its progeny . . . .”); Bond, supra note 5, at 2158 (“[A] court generally must 
remand to an agency if it finds the agency has committed legal error or has 
failed to address a material issue.”); Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008; see 
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failure to apply Chenery to questions of law not only 
misinterprets Supreme Court precedent but also violates 
separation of powers.258  That said, there is a plausible 
argument for why the Federal Circuit should not apply 
Chenery to PTO determinations of law (though neither the 
Federal Circuit, nor any other court declining to apply 
Chenery to questions of law, has considered the argument in 
its opinions). 
The argument for not applying Chenery to PTO 
determinations of law stems from Chenery’s relationship with 
Chevron deference, which is a form of judicial deference 
granted to some agency interpretations of a statute that the 
agency administers.  Under Chevron, a court determines 
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute by 
first looking to whether the statute specifically addresses the 
precise issue before the agency (“Chevron Step One”).259  If the 
statute does not specifically address the issue, the agency’s 
interpretation receives deference if the interpretation is 
reasonable (“Chevron Step Two”).260  Professor Stack argues, 
and courts have held,261 that Chenery applies at Chevron Step 
Two.  Put differently, Chenery limits what a court considers 
in determining whether an agency’s statutory interpretation 
is reasonable.  Once a court finds in Chevron Step One that 
the statute does not unambiguously address the particular 
issue, the court must limit its analysis of the reasonableness 
of the agency’s interpretation (Chevron Step Two) to the 
agency’s articulated reasons for its interpretation.262  This 
means that Chenery applies to determinations of law when 
the statute is ambiguous.263 
 
also supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 258. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 273. 
 259. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
 260. Id. at 843–44. 
 261. See Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Most 
. . . decisions apply Chenery during analysis involving Chevron’s second 
step . . . .  That is the proper place for Chenery considerations to come into 
Chevron analysis.”); see, e.g., Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the principle of Chenery “applies as well to our 
review of statutory interpretations under the second prong of Chevron”). 
 262. Stack, supra note 4, at 1010. 
 263. When Chevron deference does not apply to an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute, under standard administrative law, the review is not de novo.  
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While this broader interpretation of Chenery may work 
for most agencies, the problem with extending it to appeals 
from the PTO is that PTO decisions do not receive Chevron 
deference.264  In 2001, the Supreme Court significantly 
limited the application of Chevron as a general matter in its 
decision in United States v. Mead Corporation.265  The Court 
held that Chevron deference only applies when the agency 
has been delegated power to make decisions with the force of 
law, and the agency action is an exercise of that authority.266  
The Court stated that it “is fair to assume generally” that 
Congress has delegated the power to make decisions with the 
force of law “when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure.”267  Thus, Mead has been 
interpreted as creating a “safe harbor”268 for agency actions 
carried out through rulemaking or formal adjudication.269 
However, Mead also indicated that informal adjudications 
could, at least in theory, merit deference based on a variety of 
factors, including the agency’s practices in issuing the 
decisions, the precedential value or binding nature of the 
decisions, and the terms of the statute delegating authority to 
 
Rather, Skidmore deference applies.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 221 (2001).  Under Skidmore, the deference to an agency’s interpretation 
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944).  Professor Stack has argued that Chenery cannot be applied if only 
Skidmore deference is warranted, because, he argues, as an incident of the 
nondelegation doctrine, Chenery cannot apply to decisions by an agency that 
lack authority to bind with the force of law.  See Stack, supra note 4, at 1012.  
Whether Chenery applies in Skidmore deference may be a largely academic 
question.  When a court decides that an agency’s reasoning is sufficiently 
persuasive, it adheres to the reasoning, and thus it follows Chenery.  When a 
court decides the agency’s reasoning is not sufficiently persuasive, it does not 
adhere to the reasoning, and thus Chenery cannot apply.  Thus, asking whether 
Chenery applies seems to add little to asking whether the court will defer under 
Skidmore. 
 264. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297–99. 
 265. Mead, 533 U.S. 218.  The Federal Circuit did not apply Chevron to PTO 
decisions even before Mead limited its scope, see Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 
1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996), though scholars argued that it should.  See Nard, 
supra note 63, at 1450–65. 
 266. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 267. Id. at 229. 
 268. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 269. Id. at 229–31 (majority opinion). 
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the agency.270 
 Under current law, PTO legal determinations in patent 
denials do not receive Chevron deference.271  Commentators 
have argued, however, that they could be.  As a starting 
point, PTO determinations to grant or deny patents are 
informal adjudications, and are thus outside Mead’s safe 
harbor.272  In discussing whether Chevron should apply to 
PTO legal determinations, Professors Benjamin and Rai 
concluded that patent grants are unlikely to merit Chevron 
deference because they lack precedential value and are issued 
in great numbers by low-level officials.273  But Benjamin and 
Rai suggest that patent denials might merit Chevron 
deference, since they have gone through more levels of agency 
review.274  Denials might also be worthy of Chevron deference 
because Board decisions are issued in far fewer numbers than 
examiner decisions—under 10,000 decisions in ex parte 
appeals per year, as compared to over 500,000 examiner 
decisions per year in recent years.275  Moreover, appeals are 
decided by panels of three administrative law judges who 
issue written opinions,276 and in some cases, the Board 
designates the opinions as binding precedent for future Board 
decisions because they “add significantly to the body of 
law.”277 
Following this logic, if patent denials received Chevron 
deference, Chenery could be applied to PTO determinations of 
law.278  Indeed, Professor Stack argues that if an agency’s 
 
 270. Id. at 231–34. 
 271. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 293–301. 
 272. Id. at 298–99. 
 273. Id.  Furthermore, the PTO does not have general substantive 
rulemaking authority.  Id. at 298. 
 274. Id. at 298–99, 318. 
 275. The yearly figures for ex parte appeals of patent applications were 9,912 
cases disposed of in fiscal year 2012 and 7,292 in fiscal year 2011.  BPAI 
Statistics—Process Production Reports, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/process/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 8, 
2013).  The yearly figures for patent application disposals were 574,854 in 2012 
and 533,943 in 2011.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 229, at 
175 tbl.1. 
 276. 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012). 
 277. BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & INTERFERENCES, supra note 216, at 2–3. 
 278. In this context, determinations of law include the application of fact to 
law.  Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297 (“Under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, Chevron applies both to pure questions of legal interpretation 
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interpretive authority receives Chevron deference, it is no 
longer doctrinally plausible not to apply Chenery to 
interpretations of statutes that the agency administers.279  If 
Chevron and Chenery both applied to questions of law, the 
Federal Circuit could affirm a PTO decision only on a ground 
articulated by the PTO, unless the issue involved an 
unambiguous statute.  The statute would almost always be 
ambiguous in determinations of patent validity.  The patent 
statutes are rarely clear enough to resolve questions about 
whether a claim meets the requirements for validity.280  Thus, 
applying Chevron and Chenery to ambiguous interpretations 
of law would lead to Chenery’s application in almost all cases 
and would add significantly more certainty as to when the 
Federal Circuit would apply the Chenery doctrine. 
Realistically, however, the Federal Circuit would 
certainly resist adopting this view of Chenery and Chevron 
without express direction from the Supreme Court, given the 
Federal Circuit’s resistance to increased deference to the 
PTO.281  Applying both Chenery and Chevron would 
dramatically increase the power held by the PTO relative to 
the Federal Circuit.  The Supreme Court, in turn, almost 
certainly would not give such express direction.  Though the 
Court indicated in Mead that informal adjudication could 
receive Chevron deference in theory, the Court has yet to 
apply Chevron in such a case.282  Thus, although applying 
Chenery to questions of law and fact might resolve the 
unpredictability of the Federal Circuit’s application of the 
doctrine, it is an unrealistic solution. 
 
 
and to the interpretation involved in applying legal standards to factual 
findings, and nothing in Mead suggests a differentiation between pure and 
applied interpretations.”). 
 279. See Stack, supra note 4, at 1008. 
 280. Cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297 (describing how the PTO is 
similar to other agencies in that the organic statute does not speak precisely to 
the question at issue, and allows for legal interpretation). 
 281. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 282. Cf. Thomas Moore, Note, Abandoning Mead: Why Informal 
Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 719 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on 
how to apply Mead to informal adjudications, and circuit courts’ inconsistent 
decisions as a result). 
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3. Clarifying the Question and the Proper Level of 
Generality 
If current doctrine dictates that Chenery apply neither 
never nor always, one way to address the uncertainty of its 
application, without changing the Federal Circuit’s rule that 
Chenery applies to issues of fact but not law, would be to 
clarify the two ambiguities that I discussed earlier: (1) the 
dispositive question and (2) whether that question is one of 
law or fact. 
i. The Right Question 
For the purpose of deciding whether Chenery applies, the 
Federal Circuit has described the relevant question as both 
the determination at the agency level, as well as the potential 
alternative rationale on which the Federal Circuit might 
affirm the decision.  As I described in Part II.D.2, when a 
court declines to apply Chenery to questions of law, consistent 
identification of the relevant question is crucial for protecting 
congressionally delegated agency power.  Without consistent 
identification, a court can focus on the question that allows it 
to avoid Chenery and substitute its own reasoning. 
The original statements in Chenery I and Chenery II that 
led to the distinction between questions of law and fact are 
ambiguous as to whether the agency determination or court 
alternative should be dispositive.  The statements from 
Chenery I, that it “would be wasteful to send a case back” 
when “the appellate court concluded [a decision] should 
properly be based on another ground,”283 and that “[i]f an 
order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment 
which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it 
has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do 
service for an administrative judgment,”284 both seem to 
suggest that the court’s alternative is the relevant question.  
On the other hand, the statement in Chenery II that the 
court, “in dealing with a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must 
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds 
 
 283. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 284. Id. 
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invoked by the agency,”285 seems to suggest the opposite—
that the agency’s determination is the relevant question. 
Whether the focus is on the agency determination or 
court alternative profoundly affects the balance of power 
between a court and an agency.  If the dispositive question is 
the agency determination, the court has much less power to 
determine the outcome or reasoning of cases.  Suppose, in the 
context of the PTO, that the agency denies a patent 
application based on an erroneous finding of fact, but the 
agency could have denied the application based on a question 
of law.  The court would need to remand, perhaps repeatedly, 
until the agency grounded its decision on a factual rationale 
with which the court agreed, or until it grounded its decision 
on any question of law—at which point the court could affirm 
the decision on any basis.  This approach may seem to waste 
agency and court resources, but it preserves significant power 
in the agency.  It also emphasizes thorough and accurate 
agency decisionmaking processes. 
In contrast, if the relevant question is the alternative 
supplied by the reviewing court, and the court can find an 
alternative ground for affirmance that is an issue of law, then 
the court can affirm without regard to Chenery, regardless of 
the nature of the agency’s determination.  If, however, the 
only alternative ground for affirmance is an issue of fact, 
Chenery restricts the court, and it must remand.286  By letting 
the court choose to affirm based on an issue of law (if it can 
find one), this approach gives the court more power over 
whether Chenery will apply, and in turn to decide individual 
cases and direct the development of the law. 
In re Aoyama illustrates an example of the court’s 
increased power when the relevant question is the alternative 
ground for affirmance.  Recall that in that case, the agency’s 
rejection was based on anticipation, which is a question of 
fact, but the Federal Circuit’s alternative ground for 
affirmance was indefiniteness, a question of law.287  Because 
 
 285. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
 286. Presumably, under this approach, if the court did not propose any 
alternative reason for affirmance but applied Chenery, that would imply that 
the only alternative the court could think of was factual, and thus could not be 
used. 
 287. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011); supra text 
accompanying notes 183–190. 
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the court treated the alternative ground as the dispositive 
question, and it was able to find a rationale for affirmance 
that was a question of law, it did not have to remand the case.  
Had the agency error been the dispositive question, the court 
would have been required to remand under Chenery.  
Similarly, In re Comiskey, where the Federal Circuit 
interjected itself into the patentable subject matter debate, 
suggests another way the Federal Circuit can take advantage 
of the power that comes with focusing on the alternative 
ground for affirmance.288  Because patentable subject matter 
is an issue of law, the Federal Circuit could affirm on 
patentable subject matter in any appeal without being barred 
by Chenery, allowing it to develop its patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence whenever it chose. 
Because the relevant question for applying the law/fact 
distinction has a large impact on the balance of power, the 
best approach may depend on which agency’s decisions are 
being reviewed, and how much power Congress has delegated 
to that agency.  Also crucial is to what extent the goal of 
applying Chenery is to improve agency decisionmaking.  
Focusing on the agency error better promotes that goal as a 
general matter.  For the PTO, the argument may be slightly 
stronger for focusing on the court alternative rather than the 
agency determination.  As I have discussed above, Chenery 
probably does not play a huge role in encouraging better PTO 
decisionmaking, and the PTO is a relatively weak agency 
with less delegated power.  On the other hand, focusing on 
the court solution opens the door for overly aggressive review 
by the Federal Circuit.  Either way, though, a first step would 
be simply to consistently identify the same question as the 
relevant one, regardless of whether it is the agency 
determination or the court alternative. 
ii. Law and Fact and the Proper Level of Generality 
Even if courts were consistent in identifying the relevant 
question, unpredictability in Chenery’s application would 
 
 288. In re Comiskey itself is not an example of the effect of focusing on the 
alternative ground, since the PTO’s rejection there was for obviousness, also a 
question of law.  In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  But the 
effect would be seen in an identical case in which the PTO’s error was one of 
fact. 
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remain a significant problem in areas of law—like patent 
law—in which law and fact are intricately interwoven.  As 
Part II.D.1 discussed, in many cases, whether a question 
involves an issue of law or fact depends on the level of 
generality with which the court frames the question.  An 
effective solution would likely require tackling the underlying 
problem—the convoluted nesting in patent law of questions of 
fact within questions of law, and of questions of law within 
questions of fact.  Scholars who believe there is no true 
difference between law and fact other than the functional 
effect of the designation289 might support an overhaul of the 
doctrine such that questions identified as law and fact were 
not nested within each other.290  But scholars who believe 
that there is an analytical distinction between the two,291 
even those who think that the current division is sometimes 
“hard to reconcile,”292 “vexing,”293 or “confusing and 
unhelpful,”294 might resist such an overhaul.  Reformulating 
 
 289. These include Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo, who, in describing the 
decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), 
suggest that “the remarkable ease with which a traditional factual question can 
transmute into a legal question at the drop of a lawsuit casts further doubt on 
the proposition that we are dealing here with ontologically distinct species.”  
Allen & Pardo, supra note 113, at 1784; see also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 
86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992). 
 290. Even if it were overhauled to limit nesting of questions of law and fact, 
as long as there were a divide somewhere, there would be ambiguities at the 
dividing line.  See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (“[L]aw and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of 
rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.”); JOHN DICKINSON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
55 (1927) (“They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions . . . .  
Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach 
upward, without a break, into matters of law.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 191, at 1042–44 (addressing the view that 
there is no meaningful distinction between law and fact and arguing that while 
it has some merit, in most cases either law or fact predominates; and, more 
generally, discussing the important role of fact in patent law). 
 292. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at 1064 (“But the reasons for other 
exceptions [to requirements for validity being questions of law are] not entirely 
clear.  Judicial opinions typically state the classification of law or fact with 
nothing more than a citation to a previous opinion which, in turn, merely cites 
another previous opinion, and so on.  Some exceptions are particularly hard to 
reconcile.”). 
 293. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“The Court has 
previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact 
and questions of law.”). 
 294. See Lawson, supra note 289, at 862–63 (“[T]he law-fact distinction is 
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the law/fact divide would have broad repercussions outside 
the context of the Chenery doctrine.  Any proposed changes 
would need to carefully consider the effects on other areas of 
patent law, and should certainly not be undertaken based on 
implications for Chenery alone.  Furthermore, even if it were 
theoretically possible to clarify the distinction, the Federal 
Circuit would likely resist doing so.  Professors Benjamin and 
Rai have argued that the Federal Circuit “turn[s] facts and 
policy into law” in order to avoid giving deference to PTO 
determinations.295  While such a reformulation might be 
possible, it would be impractical to implement without other 
major changes in patent law. 
C. An Alternative Approach: Three Chenerys 
In the preceding sections, I have shown how questions of 
law and fact are so heavily intertwined in patent law that 
formalistic tests for Chenery’s application that hinge on the 
law/fact distinction lead to unpredictable and undesirable 
results.  Though one response might be to never or always 
apply Chenery, both approaches are overcorrections that leave 
the PTO with less or more deference than it is due.  
Attempting to clarify the current rule’s application is 
similarly unsatisfying.  Here, I consider an alternative 
approach, and one that I believe is ultimately the most 
promising.  My proposal provides a more predictable method 
for dividing between those appeals in which Chenery will 
apply and those in which it will not.  My proposal also takes 
better account of when Chenery ought to apply by more 
carefully considering separation of powers concerns and the 
doctrine’s costs and benefits. 
In considering how best to apply Chenery, it is important 
to remember that fundamentally, the scope of Chenery, when 
combined with the standards for judicial review, determines 
the level of deference given to agency decisions.  To some 
extent, the Federal Circuit’s approach—applying Chenery to 
issues of fact, but not issues of law, seems reasonable.  It 
reflects the assumption evident throughout administrative 
 
sometimes criticized as confusing and unhelpful . . . .”). 
 295. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 301; see Rai, supra note 191, at 1042–
65. 
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law that courts should have more power in the realm of legal 
issues, while agencies should have more power in the realm of 
factfinding.  The foundation for such an assumption is 
particularly strong for an agency like the PTO that does not 
have substantive rulemaking power, and whose statutory 
interpretations do not receive Chevron deference.  Yet, in 
areas of jurisprudence where law and fact are highly 
intertwined—like patent law—the divisions between law and 
fact are at best imprecise measures of how much deference an 
agency’s decisions ought to receive.  Therefore, I propose that 
the Federal Circuit rely instead on more precise indicators to 
determine whether and how Chenery should be applied. 
1. Chenery Revisited 
The first step in identifying more precise indicators is 
recognizing that the Federal Circuit and other courts apply 
Chenery in multiple types of situations.  In a 1969 law review 
article,296 Judge Henry Friendly examined the application of 
the Chenery doctrine since its first articulation.  He concluded 
that when courts referred to the “Chenery doctrine,” they 
were referencing what were actually three distinct bases for 
remand to the agency.  First, the court may remand when the 
agency has not adequately explained its reasoning.297  Second, 
the court may remand when the agency has relied on an 
unsustainable rationale for its decision.  This was the 
situation in Chenery itself.298  Third, the court may remand 
when the agency has relied on “insufficient or erroneous” 
determinations in supporting a rationale that would 
otherwise be correct.299  Despite Judge Friendly’s article, 
courts have often continued to use Chenery to refer to all 
three ideas without distinguishing among them.300  
Reconsidering these different uses of Chenery is the starting 
place for identifying more precise indicators of when an 
agency’s decisions ought to receive deference. 
 
 296. Friendly, supra note 5. 
 297. Id. at 206. 
 298. Id. at 209.  Judge Friendly argued this was the only situation in which 
the true Chenery doctrine applied.  Id. 
 299. Id. at 217.  Judge Friendly used the word “findings,” but because 
“findings” suggests issues of fact only, here I use “determination” in an attempt 
to think about issues without regard to formal designations as law or fact. 
 300. See Stack, supra note 4, at 964. 
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Judge Friendly’s three categories of agency errors can be 
thought of as varying in their breadth.  The narrowest type of 
error by the agency is an insufficient or erroneous 
determination.  The overall rationale is correct, and the 
agency explains its reasoning.  But either the agency has 
failed to make a necessary determination, or it has made an 
erroneous determination.  A broader error occurs when an 
agency inadequately explains its reasoning.  An even broader 
error occurs when the agency relies on an incorrect rationale.  
Judge Friendly’s insight can also be extended to the possible 
alternative reasons for affirmance by courts.  That is, the 
narrowest solution would be to make a corrective 
determination.  Slightly broader would be to reformulate the 
reasoning to support the agency’s rationale.  The broadest 
solution would be to state an entirely new rationale. 
Conceptualizing the interactions between agencies and 
courts in this way, as I have illustrated in Figure 1, provides 
a better framework to understand the relationship and 
division of power between agencies and courts when an 
agency decision is reviewed. 
 
FIGURE 1. Types of agency errors and 




For an agency like the PTO where the existing doctrine 
on deference suggests that Chenery should apply to some but 
not all agency decisions, whether Chenery is applied should 
depend on the particular situation’s position on this 
framework.  The more natural realm of the agency is the 
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individual determination—the top level of the pyramid.  The 
natural realm of the court, on the other hand, is the 
rationale—the bottom level of the pyramid.  The middle 
level—reasoning to support a rationale—lies somewhere in 
between, but arguably, it is more in the realm of the 
administrative agency.  As a matter of institutional design, it 
is desirable for agencies to explain their reasoning, not only to 
ensure that they consider their decisions thoroughly, but also 
to provide an adequate basis for court review on appeal.301 
When cases arise in an area of jurisprudence that has a 
simple division between law and fact, the top level of the 
pyramid is likely to correspond to issues of fact, whereas the 
bottom level is likely to correspond to issues of law.  In such 
an area, the application of Chenery to questions of law but not 
questions of fact may be a natural division.  But in an area 
like patent law, with its complicated structure of law and fact, 
it makes more sense to ignore formal designations of issues as 
ones law or fact, and instead to apply Chenery to 
determinations at the top but not to rationales at the bottom.  
Under an ideal rule, the types of decisions we want to keep 
within the PTO—the narrower, specific determinations on 
which the agency has the most expertise—stay in the PTO, 
but the Federal Circuit has more control over the broader 
questions involving doctrinal development. 
But an approach that simply applies Chenery to the top 
two levels of the pyramid and not to the bottom is not defined 
precisely enough to provide predictability.  Recall from the 
earlier discussion that Chenery’s application depends heavily 
on whether the reviewing court identifies the relevant issue 
for the law/fact characterization as the agency’s error or the 
reviewing court’s solution.302  The rule governing Chenery’s 
application must thus similarly consider how agency errors 
are related to reviewing court solutions. 
Ignoring for the moment the constraints of Chenery, a 
reviewing court need not correct an agency error with a 
solution of corresponding breadth—it can be fixed by a 
 
 301. Cf. Friendly, supra note 5 at 208 (describing a court’s reversal and 
remand when an agency has not adequately explained its reasoning as ideally 
causing the agency to “take the hint and re-think the bases of its decision,” or at 
least giving the court “the benefit of an explicated decision”). 
 302. See supra Part II.D.2. 
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solution of equal or greater breadth.  Assume first that the 
agency error is an erroneous or insufficient determination.  
The reviewing court could take any of the three possible 
corrective approaches.  It could make a corrective 
determination; reformulate the reasoning to support the 
rationale; or supply a new rationale entirely. 
Assume instead that the error is an inadequate 
explanation of the agency’s reasoning.  Because the error was 
broader than an erroneous or insufficient determination, the 
court cannot affirm the decision as in the example above 
simply by making a corrective determination.  But the 
reviewing court still has two options.  It might flesh out the 
reasoning to go with the particular rationale that the agency 
relied upon; or it could choose and develop a new rationale. 
Assume, finally, that the error is an unsustainable 
rationale.  In such a case, it does no good for the reviewing 
court to correct an insufficient or erroneous determination, or 
to provide reasoning for the agency’s rationale.  The only 
viable approach for the court to affirm the decision is to find a 
new rationale and fully develop it.303  These ideas are 
illustrated in the diagram below. 
 
FIGURE 2. Types of agency errors, solutions upon 




 303. Note that fully developing a new rationale would require also 
addressing the layers of the pyramid above it—providing any needed reasoning 
and subsidiary determinations. Similarly, if the court provides new reasoning 
for an agency-supplied rationale, that might, too, require making subsidiary 
determinations. 
MOTOMURA FINAL 8/22/2013  3:56 PM 
2013] RETHINKING THE CHENERY DOCTRINE 885 
 
The slope of the arrows reflects how closely the solution 
is tailored to the error.  A horizontal arrow represents a 
closely tailored solution.  In contrast, a downward-pointing 
arrow represents a less closely tailored solution.  A court that 
adopts a less closely tailored solution is, in a sense, over-
correcting the agency by adopting a solution that reaches 
more broadly than the agency’s original error. 
Whether less closely tailored solutions should be allowed 
depends on the desired allocation of power between the 
agency and court. Whether they are allowed depends on 
whether the rule for Chenery’s application focuses on the 
error by the agency or the solution by the court.  If the rule 
governing Chenery’s application focuses on the agency’s error, 
over-correction is barred.  The result is more deference to the 
agency.  Figure 3 depicts an approach to Chenery that focuses 
on agency error.  If the top two levels of the pyramid are the 
domain of the agency, and the bottom is the domain of the 
court, then the solid arrow indicates a permissible solution for 
the court to apply to affirm the agency decision.  The dashed 
arrows indicate solutions blocked by Chenery, leading to 
remand to the agency.  As Figure 3 shows, only when the 
agency error is an unsustainable rationale may the reviewing 
court affirm the decision instead of remanding.  If the agency 
error is an insufficient or erroneous determination, or 
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FIGURE 3. Chenery’s application when the 




In contrast, suppose that Chenery’s application depends 
on the proffered solution by the court.  If the court adopts this 
approach, it can engage in some degree of over-correction.  
The result is that less deference is given to the agency, as 
shown below in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4. Chenery’s application when the 
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As Figure 4 illustrates, the reviewing court has 
significantly more power when the rule for applying Chenery 
relies on the court’s proffered solution because the court can 
always override the agency by providing a new rationale. 
Neither of the Chenery rules shown in Figures 3 or 4 is 
entirely satisfactory.  An ideal rule would keep the top two 
layers of the pyramid within the agency, yet still allow the 
court to have control over the bottom layer.  That means that 
the Chenery rule should focus on both the error and the 
solution.  We want the rule to discipline an agency—and give 
it a second chance—by remanding if it makes an incorrect or 
erroneous determination, or if it fails to explain its reasoning.  
This approach incentivizes and reinforces better 
decisionmaking at the agency level.  But we also want to 
prevent the reviewing court from encroaching on agency 
power.  The court should not be allowed to make a corrective 
determination or substitute its own reasoning simply because 
its solution is to provide a new rationale. 
Applying this reasoning, I propose a rule that is a hybrid 
of the rules illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  If the agency error 
falls in the top two levels of the pyramid—either an 
insufficient or erroneous determination, or an inadequate 
explanation of reasoning—Chenery applies, and the reviewing 
court must remand.  If the agency error falls in the bottom 
level of the pyramid—an unsustainable rationale—the court 
need not remand if a new rationale can support affirmance 
without requiring a new subsidiary determination.  In other 
words, if the agency has already made (most likely in another 
context) all of the subsidiary determinations, if any, on which 
a new rationale would rely, then Chenery would not bar a new 
rationale for affirmance.  If, however, the new rationale 
required a subsidiary determination that ought to be 
entrusted to the agency, the reviewing court would still be 
required to remand to the agency.304 
This proposal has parallels to the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning in In re Comiskey and In re Aoyama.  Recall that 
 
 304. Under my rule, it would be permissible for the court to articulate new 
reasoning to support a new rationale, as long as there was no new 
determination.  The court could also continue to recognize the exceptions of 
harmless error, reasonable discernability, and statutorily compelled outcomes.  
See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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those decisions suggested that Chenery might bar a reviewing 
court from affirming based on a legal determination, if that 
legal determination hinged on a subsidiary factual 
determination that the agency had not made.305  My proposal 
similarly recognizes the dependence of broader court 
solutions on subsidiary determinations.  However, under my 
proposal, the court’s ability to provide a new rationale is 
dependent on finding agency reliance on an unsustainable 
reason.  This stands in stark contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 
approach in Comiskey.  The applicant there appealed the 
Board’s rejection of his claims as obvious, but the court 
declined to reach the question of obviousness, instead finding 
a number of the claims directed toward unpatentable subject 
matter.306  Under my proposal, the Federal Circuit must first 
consider the reasoning followed by the agency.  Only if the 
court finds fault with the agency’s reasoning may it 
determine whether Chenery allows affirmance on another 
basis.  This approach respects the PTO’s role as the 
adjudicator of patent applications in the first instance.  
Indeed, for the Federal Circuit to supply an alternative 
ground for affirmance when it has not found fault with the 
PTO’s decision at all, as in Comiskey, is perhaps the most 
concerning of all possible outcomes from a separation of 
powers standpoint. 
2. Applying the Rule to Review of PTO Decisions 
i. Insufficient or Erroneous Determinations 
How would this rule apply in the context of Federal 
Circuit review of PTO denials of patent applications?  Most of 
the cases I have discussed in this Article would fall into the 
category of insufficient or erroneous determinations.  In re 
Skvorecz,307 In re Klein,308 In re Zurko (Zurko IV),309 and In re 
Aoyama310 were instances of erroneous determinations.  In 
those cases, the Board articulated its reasoning and based its 
 
 305. See supra notes 159–163. 
 306. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 307. 580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 308. 647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 309. 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 310. 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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rejection on a rationale that was generally appropriate for 
denying an application—anticipation or obviousness—but it 
made an erroneous determination to support that rationale.  
In both Skvorecz and Zurko, the Board incorrectly found that 
an existing patent had a particular element of the applicant’s 
claim, based on misevaluating the content of the prior art 
patent.311  In Klein, the agency incorrectly treated the prior 
art as analogous.312  In Aoyama, the agency incorrectly 
construed the application’s claims.313 
Under my proposal, Chenery would be applied in these 
cases, leading the Federal Circuit to remand the case back to 
the agency.  When the agency’s insufficient or erroneous 
determinations are issues of fact, my proposed rule will lead 
to the same outcome as the Federal Circuit’s current rule that 
Chenery applies to questions of fact but not law.  But my 
proposal will reach different results when the agency 
determinations are issues of law.  This would happen, for 
instance, when they are claim constructions, as in Aoyama.  
This result makes sense in light of the justifications for 
Chenery.  Making the correct determinations to support a 
rationale, regardless of whether those determinations are 
formally legal or factual, to grant or deny a patent is a 
function that most clearly fits within the PTO’s delegated 
authority to adjudicate patent applications.  This is also an 
area in which the PTO has greater expertise as compared to 
the courts, so applying Chenery should result in better 
decisionmaking.314 
ii. Inadequate Explanations of Reasoning 
In re Thrift and In re POD-NERS are harder to 
categorize.  Both could reasonably be classified as either 
insufficient determinations, at the top of the agency error 
 
 311. Skvorecz, 580 F.3d at 1267; Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1385. 
 312. Klein, 647 F.3d at 1352. 
 313. Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1297. 
 314. See supra text accompanying notes 220–225.  Indeed, Professor Rai has 
argued that claim construction, though technically an area of law, is one where 
judges “would be well-advised to turn to the testimony of experts.”  Rai, supra 
note 194, at 881–82.  Of course, applying Chenery to erroneous or inadequate 
determinations of law is at odds with the current (though often criticized) 
doctrine dictating de novo review of PTO determinations of law, including claim 
constructions. 
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pyramid, or inadequate explanations of reasoning, at the 
middle level of the pyramid.  Indeed, it will often be difficult 
to distinguish between insufficient determinations and 
inadequate explanations.  But it is not necessary to parse the 
distinction under my proposed rule, because cases are 
remanded when the PTO’s error falls into either category. 
Another example of a Board decision that would fit into 
the middle layer of the pyramid can be seen in Gechter v. 
Davidson.315  There, the Board held that the claims were 
anticipated.316  On appeal, the Federal Circuit criticized the 
Board for its insufficient analysis, which “lack[ed] the level of 
specificity necessary,”317 for “meaningful appellate 
scrutiny.”318  The court complained that the Board’s opinion 
“lack[ed] a claim construction, ma[de] conclusory findings 
relating to anticipation, and omit[ted] any analysis on several 
limitations.”319  In cases like Gechter, the Board has not done 
its job.  But it is difficult to pinpoint whether the agency’s 
error was one of fact or law.  Broadly speaking, the issue in 
Gechter was anticipation, which is a question of fact.  But 
more particularly, the Federal Circuit criticized the Board’s 
opinion for lacking several specific subparts of a proper 
anticipation analysis, including that the opinion lacked any 
claim construction (an issue of law) and that it failed to 
explain whether and how another reference contained the 
claim’s limitations (an issue of fact).320 
This situation does not fit well into the law/fact 
dichotomy of the Federal Circuit’s current Chenery rule.  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Gechter did not 
mention the law/fact dichotomy, but merely said it was 
remanding due to the lack of specificity necessary for review.  
Thus, how the Federal Circuit would apply its articulated 
rule is hard to predict.  But under my proposed rule, the 
outcome is clear: the case would be remanded to the agency. 
Remanding when the court has insufficiently explained 
its reasoning is consistent with several of the policy 
 
 315. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  This case was an 
appeal from an interference proceeding.  Id. at 1456. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 1459. 
 318. Id. at 1458. 
 319. Id. at 1460. 
 320. Id. 
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rationales behind Chenery.  Remanding when the agency has 
not carried out a sufficient analysis allows the agency a 
second chance to use its delegated authority to adjudicate the 
patent application, which encourages better agency 
decisionmaking.  When a large part of the analysis remains to 
be done, remand also allows that analysis to be done by 
agency experts rather than more generalist Article III judges.  
To be sure, I suggested earlier that Chenery may not lead to 
huge improvements in the quality of PTO decisionmaking, 
given that standard PTO procedure requires that that 
rationales and reasoning be articulated at the time of 
decisionmaking.321  But in the event that the agency has 
failed to follow these procedures, Chenery’s positive effects 
may be substantial. 
iii. Unsustainable Rationales 
Cases at the bottom level of the agency error pyramid—
when the agency relies on an unsustainable rationale—are 
rare in appeals of PTO decisions.  In these cases, the 
rationale articulated by the agency is an inappropriate basis 
for the agency’s decision, and not simply because it is 
supported by an erroneous or insufficient determination.  
Presumably, these types of errors in PTO decisions are rare 
because the basic rationales for denying patent applications 
are well established.  When the PTO denies patent 
applications, it generally does so for failure to meet one of the 
statutory requirements for receiving a patent: patentable 
subject matter, utility, novelty, obviousness, and the 
disclosure requirements.322  Denials for these reasons are 
frequent and rarely venture into uncharted doctrinal 
territory.323  This contrasts sharply with a situation such as 
the one in Chenery itself.  There, the SEC was dealing with a 
newly enacted statute providing for new areas of agency 
authority.324  As described by Judge Friendly, the SEC was 
 
 321. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 322. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (West 2012). 
 323. The Board states in its standard operating procedures that “The Board 
annually issues a large number of opinions in appeals . . . .  These opinions are 
written primarily for the benefit of the parties to the proceedings.  Most 
opinions do not add significantly to the body of law.”  BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & 
INTERFERENCES, supra note 216, at 1. 
 324. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943). 
MOTOMURA FINAL 8/22/2013  3:56 PM 
892 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
“venturing into terra incognita.”325  In appeals of patent 
denials, terra incognita is rare.326 
I have found only one instance since the Federal Circuit’s 
creation in 1982 in which it discussed Chenery in the context 
of this type of Board error.  In that case, the court reviewed a 
PTO decision to reject a reissue application.327  Reissue of a 
patent can be sought “[w]henever any patent is, through 
error, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid . . . by 
reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a 
right to claim.”328  The applicant filed an application for 
reissue, but the examiner rejected the application.  The Board 
affirmed on the rationale that the statutory requirements for 
reissue were not met, because the applicant did not intend to 
claim in his original patent the subject matter of the new 
claims.329 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the Board had 
misconstrued the prior case law.330  The court held that intent 
to claim the subject matter of the new claims was not an 
independent statutory requirement for reissue.331  The PTO 
argued for an alternative rationale for affirmance—that the 
application was actually an untimely attempt to reissue a 
different patent with broader claims.332  The Federal Circuit 
rejected the Commissioner’s argument, stating that it was a 
post hoc rationalization by agency lawyers, which could not be 
considered under Chenery.333 
 
 
 325. Friendly, supra note 5, at 209. 
 326. It is, of course, not nonexistent.  This may be particularly true in 
upcoming years with the changes in the patent system due to the America 
Invents Act.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284-341 (2011). 
 327. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 328. 35 U.S.C.A. § 251(a) (West 2012).  Prior to the implementation of the 
America Invents Act in 2012, and at the time of In re Hounsfield, reissue also 
required the error to be “without any deceptive intention.” 35 U.S.C. § 251 
(2006); 35 U.S.C § 251 (1976). 
 329. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1321–22. 
 330. Id. at 1322–23. 
 331. Id. at 1323–24. 
 332. Id. at 1324.  Claims can be broadened on reissue, but only within two 
years of the grant of the original patent.  35 U.S.C.A. § 251(d) (West 2012). 
 333. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324.  This case was the first in which the 
Federal Circuit applied Chenery, and it was before the court suggested its more 
limited view of the doctrine.  See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. 
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Under my proposal, the key factor for determining 
whether Chenery applies in such a situation is that the PTO 
relied on an unsustainable rationale.  The PTO’s rationale 
was that the applicant did not intend to claim in his original 
patent the subject matter of the new claims, but the Federal 
Circuit held that was not a proper basis for a rejection.  
Because this case would fall into the bottom level of the 
pyramid, the court could affirm based on the PTO’s new 
argument, as long as it could do so without making any new 
subsidiary determinations.334 
Again, this outcome is consistent with Chenery’s 
underlying justifications.  When the agency relies on an 
incorrect rationale, it is less appropriate to apply Chenery 
than in the other two contexts discussed above.  The PTO is 
most likely to rely on an incorrect rationale when the agency 
misunderstands the law, or when it is charting new doctrinal 
territory.  But the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking 
authority—so to the extent that Chenery is “justified as an 
incident of delegation,”335 its application to unsustainable 
rationales may be appropriate to protect the agency’s 
delegated power only when the affirmance requires a 
subsidiary determination that the agency should retain the 
power to make.336 
Of course, the rule I have proposed here has its own 
drawbacks.  My proposal will not always lead to predictable 
outcomes, and lawyers will often be able to argue 
persuasively that a case falls into the area of the pyramid 
that most supports their desired outcomes.  Even Judge 
Friendly admitted that it was not always clear into which of 
his three categories a case would fit, and that determining 
when Chenery applied was “more an art than a science.”337 
 
 334. The Federal Circuit opinion from this case does not develop the 
alternative rationale for affirmance sufficiently to determine whether the court 
could have affirmed without making any new subsidiary determinations. 
 335. Stack, supra note 4, at 1004. 
 336. Chenery’s application could also be appropriate in reasons related to 
procedural matters, where the PTO does have rulemaking authority.  Benjamin 
& Rai, supra note 12, at 297–98. 
 337. Friendly, supra note 5, at 224 (“I am not so naïve as to think that all 
cases can be neatly pigeonholed . . . .”); id. at 199–200 (“Although, when I began 
my labors, I had the hope of discovering a bright shaft of light that would 
furnish a sure guide to decision in every case, the grail has eluded me; indeed I 
have come to doubt that it exists.  Determination when to reverse and remand a 
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Furthermore, it is almost certain as a practical matter 
that the Federal Circuit would not independently implement 
my proposal.  Few cases would fall into the bottom level of the 
pyramid—and even fewer of those would not require any new 
subsidiary determinations—so implementing it would require 
the Federal Circuit to significantly increase the deference 
that it grants to the PTO.  This greater deference would 
involve not only applying Chenery in situations where the 
Federal Circuit does not currently apply Chenery, but also no 
longer applying de novo review to some agency 
determinations of law—most notably many claim 
constructions. 
Even if my proposal does not align with current Federal 
Circuit jurisprudence, it does align more closely with recent 
Supreme Court opinions’ rejections of exceptionalism in 
administrative law.  In Zurko III, the Supreme Court 
emphasized “the importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action.”338  More 
recently in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and 
Research v. United States, the Court similarly rejected a 
nonuniform approach to administrative review for tax law.339  
My proposal brings the Federal Circuit’s application of the 
Chenery doctrine in review of patent denials closer to the 
approach of most other courts in reviewing other agencies.  
Although it would not require Chenery to be applied as 
broadly, it would broaden its application significantly and 
create a much more limited set of circumstances—
corresponding to the less expansive delegation of power to the 




decision  . . . is, I fear, perhaps more an art than a science.”). 
 338. Zurko III, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 339. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011); Kumar, supra note 5, at 233 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mayo as rejecting specialized rules of administrative law for tax 
decisions, “reaffirm[ing] its position against exceptionalism in administrative 
law,” and raising the “question of how long the Federal Circuit will be able to 
continue flouting core principles of administrative law to promote uniformity in 
patent law”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Though administrative law applies across many 
substantive areas, scholars have noted that it is not possible 
to understand the significance of its principles “apart from 
the substantive responsibilities of particular agencies and the 
means available to those agencies for accomplishing their 
goals.”340  This is particularly true with regard to the Chenery 
doctrine, which limits the options of a reviewing court by 
requiring it to remand a case to the agency rather than adopt 
its own reasons for affirming.  The principle may initially 
appear simple, but it is in fact quite complicated in 
application. 
In this Article, I have explored the contours of the 
Chenery doctrine by focusing on the Federal Circuit’s review 
of PTO decisions to deny patent applications.  The Federal 
Circuit, like a few other courts, has articulated the view that 
Chenery applies to questions of fact, but not to questions of 
law.  As I have illustrated, this view leads to unpredictability 
in when the court will apply Chenery.  This unpredictability 
leads not only to unnecessary costs for litigants and for the 
agency, but it seriously threatens the balance of power 
between agencies and courts.  A court can exploit the 
imprecision of Chenery’s scope to encroach on agency power, 
the very outcome Chenery is meant to protect against.  This 
risk is particularly great in the Federal Circuit, which has 
historically resisted giving the PTO the deference that 
standard principles of administrative law would provide. 
In large part, the unpredictability of Chenery’s 
application reflects the deeper problem that the distinction 
between law and fact, particularly in patent law, is a poor 
guide for distinguishing agency decisions that deserve 
deference during judicial review from those decisions that 
should be in judicial hands.  The application of Chenery 
should instead depend on the type of error made by the 
agency in reaching its decision and on what grounds the 
reviewing court proposes to affirm the decision.  Articulating 
a clear rule of this sort would go a long way in making the 
court’s approach not only more predictable, but also better 
aligned with Chenery’s conceptual and policy foundations. 
 
 340. BREYER, supra note 1, at 3. 
